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Abstract 
Ahmad Kindawi 
A NEW SYNTHSIS: SAUDI SALAFISM AND THE CONTESTED IDEOLOGIES OF 
MUḤAMMAD SURŪR 
2019-2020 
Corinne L. Blake, Ph.D. 
Master of Arts in History 
 
The thesis examines the life and thought of Muḥammad Surūr Zayn al-ʿĀbidīn, 
the Syrian ideologue and founder of an influential Islamist trend within the Ṣaḥwa 
(Awakening) movement in Saudi Arabia. In the highly politicalized Saudi Islamist scene 
of the early 1970s, Surūr came up with a unique synthesis: an amalgam of the political 
awareness of the Muslim Brotherhood in seeking political reform and the implementation 
of an Islamic order and the religious thought of Wahhābīs. Under the influence of Surūr’s 
ideas, a new group appeared, al-Surūriyya, which had a significant impact on Saudi 
Islamic activism, becoming the main group within it. Surūr positioned himself and his 
followers as centrist Salafis. While rejecting the violent approach of the “ḥizb al-Ghulāt” 
(radicals), Surūr condemned “ḥizb al-Wulāt” (loyalists), who called for total obedience to 
the rulers; he also wrote influential anti-Shiʿi treatises. Analyzing the debates between 
Surūr, who advocated non-violent political activism, and “ḥizb al-Wulāt,” who adopted a 
quietist posture, sheds light on the ongoing discussion about political engagement among 
Salafis. This thesis is mainly drawn from primary sources: Surūr’s own corpus of 
political and religious writings, journalistic work, and memoirs and a series of seven 
recorded television interviews with Surūr as well as writings of other Salafis, especially 
his opponents. 
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Chapter 1 
The Surūrī Synthesis: Between Quietism and Political Engagement 
Muḥammad Surūr bin Nāyef Zayn al-ʿĀbidīn, hereafter Muḥammad Surūr, 
founded the Islamist trend that later came to be known al-Surūriyya (Surūrism). Surūr’s 
influential ideology, which is also known as al-Salafiyya al-Ḥarakiyya (dynamic or 
activist Salafism), dominated the intellectual and religious spectrum of Saudi Arabia 
between the 1980s and 1990s and is still popular in the Muslim world. The popularity of 
Muḥammad Surūr’s ideas is rooted in his particularly creative approach to combing 
elements of two of the most influential forces in 20th century Islamic life: the Salafī 
creed—theological views stressing a return the al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ (the pious ancestors) and 
a rejection of the schools of Sunni Islamic jurisprudence (madhāhib)—and the political 
views of the Muslim Brotherhood. Often referred to as a ḥarakī (politically activist) 
trend, the Surūrīs—upholders of this ideology—diverged from many of their fellow 
Saudi Wahhābīs by expressing an interest in public affairs and engaged in political and 
social matters that had previously been solely the prerogative of the royal family. More 
interestingly, they began to express oppositional opinions about the political actions of 
the Saudi government just as the traditional Wahhābī religious establishment 
unquestionably sanctioned all of the regime’s policies. Thus, as we shall see, Surūr 
infused the political activism of the Muslim Brotherhood into Wahhābī traditions, staking 
out a popular, yet perilous, Salafi synthesis that placed his movement at odds with 
quietists and the Saudi state alike. 
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In the early twentieth century, as part of his effort to re-establish the Saudi 
Kingdom, King ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz Ibn Saʿūd reinstated the Wahhābī religious establishment, 
which had played a significant role in the formation of the first and second Saudi 
kingdoms. However, he realized that in order to survive in the international arena, he 
needed to restrain the zealotry of the Ikhwān (brothers), the tribal fighting force that he 
used to conquer various regions, as these fighters were very critical of the King’s 
pragmatic relationship with Western countries. Thus, in the late 1920s, he crushed his 
erstwhile military protectors when they challenged his authority and created a division of 
powers formula which stipulated that the Āl Saʿūd (House of Saʿūd) would rule and 
determine the country’s foreign and economic policy independent of Islamic 
jurisprudence, leaving the Wahhābī ʿulamāʾ to control the vast religious, cultural, and 
social spheres. In return, Wahhābī religious leaders would provide religious legitimacy 
for Āl Saʿūd’s rule through an interpretation of the Qurʾān and other Islamic texts, which 
justified the authority of Āl Saʿūd and made obeying the rulers part of the mandate to 
obey God. 1 Since then, political quietism has dominated the Wahhābī religious leaders’ 
behavior and discourse; the Wahhābī ʿulamāʾ limited their political involvement to only 
providing naṣīḥa (advice) to the rulers, usually behind the scene.2  
In the 1950s, increasing oil production in the Kingdom and the influx of 
enormous profits, especially after the oil crisis in 1973, begin to undermine this quietest 
consensus. Between the 1950s and 1970s, members of the Muslim Brotherhood, who fled 
 
1 David Commins, The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia (London: I. B. Tauris, 2006), 71-72; Madawi 
Al-Rasheed, Contesting the Saudi State: Islamic Voices from a New Generation (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007), 10-11. 
2 Roel Meijer, “Introduction,” in Global Salafism: Islam’s new religious movement, ed. Roel Meijer (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 17. 
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from the repression of Arab and Baʿthist socialist regimes in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq often 
played  a leading role in the rapid development of the Kingdom’s institutions.3 Members 
of the Muslim Brotherhood held high-level positions in the education system in Saudi 
Arabia and taught in high schools and universities, out of which emerged al-Ṣaḥwa al-
Islāmiyya (the Islamic Awakening), an Islamic movement that developed in Saudi Arabia 
between the 1960s and 1990s.4 One of the Muslim Brotherhood members who influenced 
the Ṣaḥwa was the Syrian Shaykh Muḥammad Surūr, who taught in Saudi Arabia 
between the 1960s and 1970s; in the early 1970s, he founded the dominant jamaʿa 
(group) generally referred to as “al-Surūriyya.”  
While followers of Muḥammad Surūr might share with some of these other Salafi 
groups a willingness to engage in political opposition, they nonetheless diverged from 
Salafi jihādī counterparts on matters of violence and positioned themselves as centrists 
among other Salafīs. On the one hand, Surūr rejected rebellion with the sword against the 
rulers because it leads to fitna (internal strife). On the other, he refused the practice of 
Salafī and Wahhābī loyalists of unconditional obedience to the rulers, asserting that 
political activism is consistent with Salafī manhaj (methodology).5 While Surūr adopted 
the political vision of the Muslim Brotherhood in seeking to effect political reform, 
despite his previous connections with the Muslim Brotherhood, like other Salafīs, he 
 
3 Gilles Kepel, The War for Muslim Minds: Islam and the West, trans. Pascale Ghazaleh (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2004), 171-177. 
4 Stéphane Lacroix, Awakening Islam: Religious Dissent In Contemporary Saudi Arabia, trans. George 
Holoch. (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2011), 38; Al-Rasheed, Contesting, 67. 
5 Muḥammad Surūr Zayn al-ʿĀbidīn. “Naḥwa Kiyān Jadīd (28) Al-Ḥiwār Bayna Ahl al-Sunah: Al-
Salafiyyia bayna al-Wulāt wa al-Ghulāt” [Toward new Entity (28) Dialogue between the People of Sunnah: 
The Salafism between the Loyalist and the Extremists (the Extremists.)] Al-Sunnah 65, 1997) [1417]. 
Muḥammad Surūr Zayn al-ʿĀbidīn, “Naḥwa Kiyān Jadīd (29) al-Ḥiwār Bayna Ahl al-Sunnah: Al-
Salafiyyia bayna al-Wulāt wa al-Ghulāt,” [Toward new Entity (29) Dialogue between the People of 
Sunnah: the Salafism between the Loyalist and the Extremists.] Al-Sunnah 67 (1997). 
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attacked the organization for focusing more on politics than on purification of faith. To 
avoid criticism from the Wahhābīs and Salafīs in Saudi Arabia for being overtly political, 
Muḥammad Surūr used the slogans of the Salafi and Wahhābī ʿulamāʾ in his teachings 
and rhetoric. He emphasized the Wahhābī slogan “creed first,” for example, which 
suggested the superiority of creed not only over politics, but also over other religious 
subjects like jurisprudence.6 However, he also reformulated concepts borrowed from the 
Muslim Brotherhood to be consistent with the Salafī creed and elaborated principles to 
enable engagement in politics.  
Surūrī thought thus provided the tools to go beyond the existing Salafi binaries of 
revolution and political quietism found in the practices of both Salafi and Wahhābī 
schools, laying the groundwork for opposition to the Saudi regime through the expression 
of explicitly non-violent political activism. However, as shall be shown in chapter four, 
this novel hybrid ideology elicited strident opposition from other Salafī schools, such as 
the Jāmī movement (Salafi group who adopted a quietist posture). 
Significance of the Thesis 
Since 9/11, Salafī groups have commanded widespread academic and policy-
studies attention, but most of this research emphasis has focused on Salafī-jihadīs, who 
adopted violent acts against the existing political regimes and called for establishment of 
the Islamic Caliphate. Non-violent Salafī groups, by contrast, have attracted scant interest 
from researchers. Despite its popularity and wide prevalence over three decades across 
 
6 ʿAdullah Nāb, “Mushaḥnat bayna al-Jāmiyya wa al-Surūriyya fi al-Saʿūdiyya” (Hassles between Surūrīs 
and Jāmīs in Saudi Arabia). Ilaf, May 20, 2005. 
http://elaph.com/Web/Politics/2005/5/63497.htm?sectionarchive=Politics. 
5 
 
Saudi Arabia, the Surūri group (jamāʿa) has received almost no attention from 
researchers.  
As detailed below, the few accounts that exist portray the ideology of Surūr and 
his followers as a hybrid ideology of Wahhābīsm and the Muslim Brotherhood, without 
providing any analysis of his thought based on his writings. Most of the Arabic accounts 
hold this jamāʿa (group) responsible for the radicalization of the Saudi population and 
breeding violence without providing evidence from Surūr or other Surūris’ writings or 
practices. This thesis is an intellectual biography of Shaykh Muḥammad Surūr offering 
insights into his life, his intellectual works, and political activism. The thesis draws 
mainly upon primary sources such as Surūr’s books, articles, lectures, and interviews to 
analyze the Surūrī ideology, political vision, and his position within the Salafiyya 
movement and gain a more in-depth picture of his ideas, thoughts, and synthesis. 
Although Salafīs belong to the same theological system, the Salafiyya movement is not 
homogeneous, and boundaries between its groups are fluid. Through analyzing the views 
and actions of different Salafī groups on politics and violence and analyzing intra-Salafī 
debates, this study reveals doctrinal differences and political distinctions between the 
groups and provides a new understanding of the Salafiyya movement’s diversity. In 
addition to contributing to our understanding of Salafism, the thesis provides insight into 
significant events and transitional periods in the history of Saudi Arabia and Islamist 
movements. 
The thesis comprises five chapters. After examining the historical background and 
context, the first chapter discusses the historiography of this topic. Chapter 2 focuses on 
the formation of Surūr’s ideas and the creation of his synthesis. The third chapter 
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explores Surūr’s very popular anti-Shia and anti-Iran views that were not only doctrinal 
accusations but also ethnic and political attacks. The fourth chapter examines Salafī 
engagement in politics, analyzing intra-Salafī debates between Surūr, who adopted non-
violent political activism, and the Jāmīs, or as Surūr called them “ḥizb al-wulāt (party of 
loyalists),” who took a quietist posture. Finally, chapter five explores Surūr’s rejection of 
rising extremist currents within Salafī circles in the second half of the twentieth century.  
Historical Background: The Origins of Wahhābī Quietism and Salafī Challenge 
Between 1902 and 1932, after defeating several rivals, ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz was able to 
unify most of Arabia under his leadership. After he recaptured Riyadh in 1902 from the 
Rashīds, the Wahhābī followers of the Muslim reform movement, founded by 
Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb in the 18th century in Najd, central Arabia, were keen 
to restore a relationship with Āl Saʿūd.7 The Wahhābīs, who purported to be returning to 
the “true” principles of Islam, declared ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz their imam, a religious title that 
gave him legitimacy for political and military leadership.8 The restoration of the alliance 
set the boundaries of the political-religious relationship between ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz and the 
Wahhābīs. 
It is crucial to understand the political position of the Wahhābī ʿulamāʾ during the 
period of unification of the Kingdom because of the defining political role they have 
continued play until the present day. According to the scholar Madawi Al-Rasheed, King 
 
7 It is important to note the followers of Shaykh ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb have rejected this label. Historically, 
they called themselves al-mūwaḥidūn (the people of monotheism) and they prefer to be called Salafis. In 
current academic discourse, the followers of the teachings of Shaykh ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb are referred to as 
Wahhabis, not as Salafīs. 
8 Madawi Al-Rasheed, A History of Saudi Arabia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 50.  
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ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz and the kings after him derived their legitimacy from their “recognition 
and enforcement of the Sharīʿa, a divine law above him and independent of his will.”9 In 
return, the Wahhābīs advocated in their sermons and teachings for the obedience of and 
submission to King ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz as walī al-amr, leader of the Muslim community. They 
also played a significant role in the creation of the Ikhwān (the tribal fighting force). The 
Wahhābī ʿulamāʾ launched an educational program targeting nomadic tribesmen whose 
practices were seen as un-Islamic. They sought to teach these tribal groups what they 
perceived as authentic Islamic tradition and recruit them as soldiers for the Saudi 
expansion.10 
After helping ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz -conquer Mecca and the Hejaz, however, the Ikhwān 
became very critical of the monarch’s relationship with Western countries. They believed 
that all-non-Wahhābīs, including Muslims who didn’t accept their version of “true 
Islam,” were infidels. Additionally, after defeating ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz’s rivals in Arabia, the 
Ikhwān began raiding the areas where their rulers had treaties with the British. King ʿAbd 
al-ʿAzīz banned raiding in the border areas, and when the Ikhwān launched raids on 
southern Iraq, Transjordan, and the Emirate of Kuwait against his wishes, the tension 
between the Ikhwān and ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz escalated. Soon these tensions culminated in a 
battle that ended with ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz crushing his erstwhile Ikhwān supporters at the 
Battle of Sabilla in 1929.11 
 
9 Al-Rasheed, A History, 51-52. More on the Wahhābī ideology: Natana J. Delong-Bas, Wahhabi Islam: 
From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad (London: I.B. Tauris, 2004). 
10 Commins, The Wahhabi, 80; Al-Rasheed, A History, 59-60. On the Wahhābī relation with Saudi State: 
Guido Steinberg, “The Wahhabi Ulama and the Saudi State: 1745 to the Present”, in Paul Aarts and Gerd 
Nonneman (eds.), Saudi Arabia in the Balance, London: Hurst & Co., 2005, pp. 11–34. 
11 Commins, The Wahhabi, 76-78, 88; Kepel, The War, 161-163. 
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In 1932, King ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz declared the formation of the current Saudi Kingdom 
with the support of the Wahhābī ʿulamāʾ, who were given control over religious 
institutions and social spheres. At the same time, the Saudi royal family continually had 
to curtail the zeal of the ʿulamāʾ when they interfered with efforts to build modern 
institutions, sign oil agreements with American companies, and protect the country’s 
international borders. Furthermore, in the period after the unification of the Kingdom and 
building of national institutions, the Āl Saʿūd royal family took control of political, 
economic, foreign, and defense matters.12 In return, the Wahhābī doctrine became the 
dominant discourse of political power, and the Wahhābī ʿulamāʾ enforced the Islamic 
appearance of the public domain, serving a critical role in ensuring that the new laws and 
institutions were in agreement with the strict Wahhābī teachings. These Wahhābī clerics 
enforced segregation of the sexes, for example, and ensured the predominance of 
religious education by supervising curriculum and emphasizing theological instruction.13 
Meanwhile, the religious establishment, which became an institution under the control of 
the political royal authority, reciprocated by calling for obedience and submission to the 
walī al-amr (the ruler) and issuing fatwas (religious rulings) justifying his actions. 
Furthermore, they equated obedience to the ruler with obedience to God and the Prophet; 
political opposition or expressing a critical opinion were identified as khuruj ala walī al-
amr (rebellion against the ruler).14 
When King ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz died in 1953, the Saudi monarchy consolidated its rule 
over most of Arabia, and the Wahhābī creed became the dominant theological school 
 
12 Commins, The Wahhabi, 80-103. 
13 Ibid, 104-107. 
14 Al-Rasheed, Contesting, 49-50. 
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across the country. However, regional developments from across the Middle East, and the 
ascendance of Gamal Abdel Nasser’s Arab socialist regime in Egypt in 1952, posed an 
acute challenge to this royal-Wahhābī pact. The growing prestige of Nasser and Arab 
socialist nationalist ideologies in the Arab world posed a threat to the conservative 
Kingdom and concerned the Saudi regime, who worried that these ideas would gain 
popularity in Saudi society. However, the Wahhābī ʿulamāʾ were too traditional and did 
not have the qualifications to counter Arab social nationalist and secular influences. As a 
result, Saudi Arabia sought to forge alliances with conservative monarchies and political 
actors in the region and elsewhere to combat the supremacy of what it saw as a 
progressive movement, led by Nasser. The Saudi rulers began to emphasize the 
importance of politics in Islam against the secular nationalism of Nasser in Egypt and the 
Baʿth party in Syria and Iraq. During this time, the Saudis found in the Muslim 
Brotherhood a natural ally in this conflict.15 
The Muslim Brotherhood was established by Ḥasan al-Bannā in Egypt in 1928. 
The main goals of the movement initially consisted of fighting the British occupation and 
establishing an Islamic order in Egypt.16 After the assassination of its founder in 1949, 
the Muslim Brotherhood evolved in the 1950s under the leadership of Ḥasan al-Huḍaybī 
into a pan-Islamic movement, and it spread to many countries around the Muslim world. 
This departure from the primacy of Islam in countries that adopted nationalist-socialism 
contributed to the emergence of a new belief within the Muslim Brotherhood 
organization that the Egyptian regime was un-Islamic and beyond reform. The only way 
 
15 Kepel, The War, 159, 171-172. 
16 Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, The Muslim Brotherhood: Evolution of an Islamist Movement (Princeton: 
Princeton University, 2013), 22. 
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to reform such an un-Islamic regime, in turn, was through armed struggle.17 The group 
who promoted those ideas is often referred to as Quṭbis, a reference to the adherents of 
Sayyid Quṭb, an Egyptian author, educator, and Islamic theorist who emerged as a 
prominent leader within the Muslim Brotherhood. Ultimately, Egyptian authorities 
imprisoned and executed Quṭb for plotting to assassinate the Egyptian President, Gamal 
Abdel Nasser, in 1964.18  
While in prison, Quṭb wrote his famous work, Maʿalim fi al-Tariq (Milestones). 
In this book, he introduced the concepts of Jahiliyya and hakimiyya which he borrowed 
from the Pakistani thinkers Abū al-Aʿlā Mawdūdī and Abū Ḥasan al-Nadawi.19 The 
concept of Jahiliyya, usually translated as “the Age of Ignorance” in English, refers to 
pre-Islamic Arabia. According to Quṭb, jahiliyya is the rejection of “divine authority for 
human authority.”20 He asserted that “the whole world is steeped in Jahiliyyahha 
(ignorance)”21 In the face of the jahili regimes, Islamic law derived from Islamic scripts 
(al-hakimiyya Li-llah - the sovereignty / governance of God) is the response. This 
response should not only assume the form of “preaching and persuasion,” but also 
“physical power and jihad.”22 
 
17 Barbara Zoller, “Prison Talk: The Muslim Brotherhood’s Internal Struggle during Gamal Abdel Nasser’s 
Persecution, 1954 to 1971,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 39, no. 3 (2007): 419. 
18 More about Qutb, John Calvert, Sayyid Qutb and the Origins of Radical Islamism (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2013); Sayed Khatab, The Political Thought of Sayyid Qutb : the Theory of Jahiliyyah 
(London: Routledge, 2006); Sayed Khatab, “Hakimiyyah and Jahiliyyah in the Thought of Sayyid Qutb,” 
Middle Eastern Studies 38 (3): 147, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/714004475.  
19 Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, The Muslim Brotherhood: Evolution of an Islamist Movement (Princeton: 
Princeton University, 2013), 43. 
20 William E. Shepard, “Sayyid Qutb’s Doctrine of Jahiliyya,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 
35, no. 4 (11, 2003): 524, 
http://ezproxy.rowan.edu/login?url=https://search.proquest.com/docview/195593321?accountid=1360.  
21 Sayyid Qutb, Milestones, ed. A.B. al-Mehri (Birmingham: Maktabah Booksellers and Publishers, 2006), 
26. 
22 Ibid, 65. 
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After Muslim Brotherhood members attempted to assassinate Nasser in 1954, he 
cracked down on the organization, spurring many members of the group to immigrate to 
Saudi Arabia. Another wave of the Muslim Brotherhood exiles fled to Saudi Arabia from 
Syria after the socialist Baʿth party came to power in Syria in 1963. Nonetheless, Islamist 
tendencies gained more support in the Muslim world, especially after the Arab countries’ 
devastating loss in the 1967 War, which led to a growing frustration with the secular 
regimes. Ultimately, the nationalist-socialist regimes across the region harshly repressed 
members and supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Iraq, Libya, Syria, and 
other countries. Under these circumstances, the Saudi leadership promoted the “anti-
socialist credentials” of the exiled members of the Muslim Brotherhood to counter-
balance the Arab socialism of Egypt’s Nasser. This tactic, in turn, gave the Muslim 
Brotherhood a foothold in Saudi Arabia.23 
At first, the Saudi regime welcomed this influx of Muslim Brotherhood 
dissidents, not just to signal its opposition to the advent of secular Arab socialism across 
the region, but also as a source of knowledge and skills to help with the modernization of 
the Kingdom.  Between the 1950s and 1970s, Saudi Arabia experienced massive social, 
economic, infrastructural transformations, and, the Kingdom witnessed a vast 
modernization of the state apparatus including the creation of universal education, efforts 
to foster economic development, and the advancement of communication technology. 
The impetus for these transformations stemmed mostly from growing petroleum 
revenues.24 However, Saudi Arabia did not have enough nationals or citizens with the 
 
23 Kepel, The War, 159, 171-172; Commins, The Wahhabi, 151-154. 
24 Commins, 104-108. 
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skills and expertise needed to support this process of modernization. As a result, the 
expatriate Muslim Brotherhood community, many of whom were educated professionals 
in medicine, engineering, and the sciences, provided a pool of skilled workers, though 
according to the prominent scholar Gilles Kepel, they played the role “on condition that 
they refrain from any political or religious proselytizing.”25 
Indeed, exiled members of the Muslim Brotherhood in Saudi Arabia played a 
significant role in the reformation of the educational system and held high-level 
positions, with Egyptian and Syrian Muslim Brotherhood members like Muḥammad 
Surūr, Muḥammad al- Mubārak, and Muḥammad Quṭb teaching in Saudi universities, 
colleges, and educational institutions. Others played important roles in creating academic 
curricula through which they brought their views on modern societal, political, and 
economic matters.26  
Accordingly, in the late 1960s, Saudi Arabia witnessed the emergence of what is 
often referred to as al-Ṣaḥwa al-Islāmiyya, the Islamic Awakening or the Ṣaḥwa which 
has been characterized as “a vast social movement practicing a modern form of Islamic 
activism.”27 The Ṣaḥwa movement represents a hybrid ideology based on a mix of 
Wahhābī ideas in religion and the Muslim Brotherhood’s ideas in politics.28 The Saudi 
Arabian government supported this ideology due to two incidents that suggested it could 
serve as a source of support for maintaining Āl Saʿūd’s authority internally and 
externally. The first incident was when a group of Wahhābī dissidents led by Juhaymān 
 
25 Kepel, The War, 171-172. 
26 Lacroix, Awakening, 42-46. 
27 Lacroix, Awakening, 38. 
28 Jarret Brachman, Global Jihadism: Theory and Practice (London: Routledge, 2009), 53; Kepel, The 
War, 156-57. 
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al-ʿUtaybī occupied the Grand Mosque in Mecca in 1979, aiming to topple the rule of Āl 
Saʿūd. After two weeks of a siege, Saudi Special Forces stormed the Mosque with the 
help of Pakistan’s Special Services Group and French Special Forces on 9 January 1980. 
Al-ʿUtaybī was executed by the Saudi authorities in 1980.29 In the same year, the success 
of the Iranian Revolution that established a Shīʿite Islamic state in Iran jolted the Āl 
Saʿūd rulers, who felt threatened by Ayatollah Khomeini’s revolutionary discourse 
fueling the desire for political change across the region. Consequently, the Ṣaḥwa gained 
momentum and enjoyed relative freedom to increase its influence in the 1980s across a 
variety of educational settings.30 
The Ṣaḥwa movement was represented by two main groups or jamāʿat: the 
Ikhwān (the Saudi Muslim Brotherhood) and al-Surūriyyun (Surūrīs) who were the 
dominant Islamist political group in the late 1980s and early 1990s in Saudi Arabia.31 It is 
often noted that followers of the Surūrī trend in the Kingdom represented a majority 
among Saḥwis. Other Ṣaḥwis besides those aligned with these two movements followed a 
variety of global political movements, including for example, al- Qaʿida and Hizb al-
Tahrir.32 
Two members of the exiled Muslim Brotherhood, Muḥammad Quṭb and 
Muḥammad Surūr Zayn bin Nāyef al-ʿĀbidīn played a central role in infusing younger 
Saudis with a mixture of Muslim Brotherhood political ideology and the more traditional 
Wahhābī beliefs that had long dominated the Kingdom. Muḥammad Quṭb, Sayyid Quṭb’s 
 
29 Commins, The Wahhabi, 168; Lacroix, Awakening, 99. 
30 Commins, The Wahhabi, 163-176; Kepel, The War, 178-180. 
31 Lacroix, Awakening, 63. 
32 Al-Rasheed, Contesting, 70.  
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brother, was known as shaykh al-Ṣaḥwa (the Shaykh of the Ṣaḥwa). After being released 
from Egyptian jails during Anwar Sādāt’s presidency, he moved to Saudi Arabia and 
taught at Umm al-Qura University in Mecca. He published and promoted his brother’s 
books and ideas, while mentoring the scholarship of leading Islamic theologians and 
thinkers, including people like Safar al-Ḥawālī, one of the prominent figures of the 
Ṣaḥwa movement. Muḥammad Quṭb attempted to reconcile the doctrines of the Muslim 
Brotherhood with Wahhābīsm that dominated in Saudi Arabia.33 
The Syrian Sheikh Muḥammad Surūr Zayn bin Nāyef al-ʿĀbidīn—the primary 
subject of this thesis—also played a central role in introducing a political orientation to 
Wahhābī Salafīst traditional circles in Saudi Arabia. Born in a village called Tasil in 
Darʿa province in southern Syria in 1938, Surūr’s family traces its lineage to Zayn al-
ʿĀbidīn ibn Al-Ḥusayn ibnʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib. He received his primary education in local 
schools, then moved to study his middle and secondary levels in Darʿā where he studied 
under reputable educators in Syria at that time, before finally moving in 1958 to the 
capital Damascus to complete his secondary education at the National Scientific College. 
After obtaining his degree, he joined Damascus University where he graduated from the 
Faculty of Law. Surūr benefited and was greatly influenced by senior ʿulamāʾ in 
Damascus such as Sheikh Alī Ṭanṭawī, Muḥammad al-Mubārak, and ʿIsām al-ʿAṭṭār. His 
primary influence, however, was Sheikh Muṣṭafā al-Sibāʿī, who founded the Syrian 
Muslim Brotherhood and who taught him a Personal Status Law course at the 
university.34 
 
33 Kepel, The War, 174-175; Lacroix, Awakening, 53-56; Al-Rasheed, Contesting, 66. 
34 Surūr’s bio under the title “Al-Shaykh Muḥammad Surūr Zayn al-ʿĀbidīn … Sīrah wa Masirah,” 
Surour.net, 
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In the1960s, Muḥammad Surūr became what the scholar Stephane Lacroix 
referred to as a “second-rank figure” in the movement at precisely the same time when 
the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood suffered from divisive splits between two factions.35 
Initially, Muḥammad Surūr was close to the Damascus wing of the Muslim Brotherhood 
under the secretary general ʿIsām al-ʿAṭṭār. However, he later moved more towards a 
more hardline faction of the Muslim Brotherhood led by Marwān Hadid, a student of 
Sayyid Quṭb who advocated armed struggle against the Syrian regime.36Muḥammad 
Surūr soon started to criticize the more moderate Damascus leadership of the group for 
tolerating “Ṣūfis” within its ranks, which was one of the reasons he was forced to leave 
Syria in 1965.37  
In his first broadcasting interview, Surūr said that he had to leave Syria because 
political activism became difficult under the repression of the Baʿth party, which seized 
power in March 1963. Surūr migrated to Saudi Arabia and worked as a teacher in the 
Scientific Institutes in Buraydah, Ḥāʾil and the Eastern Province. In Saudi Arabia, Surūr 
enjoyed the opportunity to meet Muslim Brotherhood members from other countries and 
continued to deepen his commitment to political activism. At the time, exiled Muslim 
Brotherhood and leaders from the Arab and Muslim world either moved to the Kingdom 
 
1%D8%A9/; Television interview with Muḥammad Surūr was broadcast by Al-Hiwar channel in March 
2008 as part of the program called Murājaʿāt [Revisions]. The series consists of seven recorded interviews. 
35 Stephane Lacroix, “Understanding Stability and Dissent in the Kingdom: the Double-Edge Role of the 
jama’at in Saudi politics,” in Saudi Arabia in Transition: Insights on Social, Political, Economic and 
Religious Change, ed. Bernard Haykel, Thomas Hegghammer, and Stephane Lacroix (Cambridge 
University Press, 2015), 171. 
36 ʿAlī al-ʿUmaym, “Mashāyikhunā wa mashāyikh al- Ṣaḥwa Nadharat fi al-Islām al-S'audi al-ḥaraki.” (Our 
Sheikhs and Sheikhs of Ṣaḥwa: insights on the Saudi ḥarakī Islam) Elaph, June 12, 2003, 
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or made frequent visits. Sheikh Surūr, who was a teacher at the Scientific Institutes, 
found fertile ground for his ideological views and activities.  
The religious environment of his new home in Saudi Arabia soon inspired 
Muḥammad Surūr to adopt the creed of Salafism, even though he never relinquished his 
commitment to political action. His method and “new convictions,” however, brought 
about long-term conflicts with Muslim Brotherhood.38 By 1969, Muḥammad Surūr broke 
away from the organization after challenging the leadership’s orders to Muslim 
Brotherhood exiles to refrain from participating in Saudi political activism. During the 
early 1970s, Muḥammad Surūr continued his political engagement and eventually 
emerged as a leading focal point of a ḥaraki (politicized activist) group among the Saudi 
youth.39 
Surūr sought to adopt and spread a new form of Islamic activism that was closer 
to the Wahhābī ideological vision, emphasizing the priority of the creed over other 
matters. Despite the instrumental role he played in establishing a new group in the 
Kingdom, Surūr continued to assert that he was not a leader of the movement because he 
is not “an ʿalim in the sharīʿa sciences,” pointing out that he does not want to “burden the 
reformist renewal project with the responsibility for [his] previous mistakes.”40 As a 
result, Falāḥ al-ʿIṭrī, a Saudi secondary school teacher in the capital Riyadh, took on the 
 
38 Muḥammad Surūr Zayn al-ʿĀbidīn, “Al-Waḥda Al-Islāmyyia 8: Surūryyia” [Islamic Unity 8: 
Sururism]al-Sunna 27, (1992) [1413 Hijri], 47.  
39 Ibid; Al-Faqīh, “Al-Sheikh Muḥammad Surūr,”; ʿUmar Al-ʿizī, “Al-Ikhwān Al-Saʿūdiyyūn ... al-tayār al-
l-dhī lam yaqul kalimath baʿd” [The Muslim Brotherhood: the trend that does not say its word yet.] Al-
‘Asar, July 25, 2004, http://web.archive.org/web/20120419120500/http://alasr.ws:80/articles/view/5547.  
40Muḥammad Surūr, “Al-Waḥda Al-Islāmyyia 8,” 57. 
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leadership role of the group.41 Saʿd al-Faqīh, a Saudi dissident in London, confirmed that 
Surūr was not the leader of this jamāʿa but that he contributed to it by way of his 
previous activist experience.42  
At the early stages of its formation in the early 1970s, the group was called 
jamāʿat Falāḥ, referring to the name of the cofounder Falāḥ al-ʿIṭrī. Surūr and most 
members of this group refused to give a name to their jamāʿa; to distinguish themselves 
from the Ikhwān (the Saudi Muslim Brotherhood), they used “zumala’a alakharun” 
(colleagues from the other side).43 The group initially did not use the term Surūrīsm; it 
was used for the first time during the Gulf War in the early 1990s, not by the followers of 
the Surūrī trend, but by their opponents. Ibrāhīm al-Sikrān, who was active in the jamāʿa, 
states that the term “came from opponents of the Surūri approach and those who were 
affected by it, especially the Saudi Muslim Brotherhood who saw in this trend Islamic 
activism’s energy wasted.”44 Surūr himself confirmed that this name came after his 
disagreement with the Muslim Brotherhood.45 However, the Jāmīs, followers of the Salafī 
Sheikh Muḥammad Amān al-Jāmī, who emerged during the Gulf War and advocated 
total obedience to the rulers in their conflict with the opposition, were responsible for 
 
41 Mishari al-Dhayidi, “Muḥammad Surūr ghādara Sūrīyah Baʿd Nakbah alIkhwān... Istaqra wa ʿallma fi 
Buraydah... Khalṭa Ḥarakiyya alIkhwān bi Thawriyya Quṭb bi Salafiyya Ibn Taymīyah,” [Muḥammad 
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Movement with Qutḅ’s Revolutionariness, Ibn-Taymiyah’s Salafism] Al-Sharq Al-Awast. October 28, 
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disseminating this epithet during their relentless dispute with the Surūrīs during the Gulf 
War.46 Probably, naming the group after a person who was not a Saudi was an attempt to 
link the jamāʿa with external actors in order to delegitimize its practice and discourse. 
Surūr’s adherence to Salafi ideology and his political activism in the Kingdom put 
him in conflict with his erstwhile Muslim Brotherhood expatriates, ultimately leading to a 
rupture with previous mentors and colleagues. In 1973, the Muslim Brotherhood 
representative in Saudi Arabia informed the Saudi authorities about Surūr’s political 
activism in the Kingdom, which ended his contract and expelled him.47 At that point, 
Surūr went to Kuwait where he worked as a contributing essayist to Al-Mujtamaʿ, a 
magazine. The magazine was published in Kuwait and was established in 1969 by the 
Association of Social Reform (Jamʿiyyat al-islaḥ al-ijtimaʿi), the Kuwaiti branch of the 
Muslim Brotherhood. In 1976, Surūr became its editor and he established the Dar al-
Arqam Publishing house. Around this time, Surūr began to study Shīʿism and published 
his well-known book, Then Came the Turn of Majūs (Zoroastrians), which criticized the 
Iranian Revolution and warned against the threat of Shīʿite domination of the Middle 
East. 48 In Kuwait, he gradually began to lose his connection with the jamāʿa in Saudi 
Arabia that he had originally inspired and instead “tried to establish a new movement, 
based in the Salimiyya neighborhood of Kuwait City, but the plan failed.”49 In 1984, 
Surūr moved to the United Kingdom where he established a center of Sunnah Studies and 
 
46 al-Dhayidi, “Muḥammad Surūr,”4. 
47 More about Surūr’s expulsion from Saudi Arabia in chapter two. 
48 Muḥammad Surūr’s Bio on his website, 
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published Sunnah magazine and several books. In 2004, he moved to Jordan before 
moving finally to Qatar, where he died in 2016.50 
Towards a Typology of Salafī and Wahhābī Diversity 
By the mid-20th century, Saudi Arabia witnessed the increasing influence of 
“modern Salafism,” a school of thought that focuses on purifying Islam from putative 
“bid’” (plural of bid’a “innovations”) and returning to the model of the Prophet and the 
al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ (the righteous ancestors).51 Salafīs reject taqlīd (“blind” following/ 
imitation) of the four Sunni schools of jurisprudence (madhahib) because they believe 
that the later generation of the Islamic scholars introduced unlawful innovations. Instead, 
the Salafīs promoted ijtihād (independent judgement) in legal matters, relying on proof 
(dalīl) from revelation (the Qurʾān) and early tradition (Sunna) to form Islamic opinions 
or legal judgments.52 
It is essential to show the main differences between the Wahhābīs and Salafīs 
because people often use the two terms interchangeably. Undoubtedly, they share a lot in 
common. Both emphasize the same theological orientation of purifying Islam from 
unlawful innovations and emphasizing the oneness of God. While the Salafīs condemn 
taqlīd and promote ijtihad, however, the Wahhābīs tend to accept the wisdom of past 
Islamic legal precedents and adopt the Hanbalī school of jurisprudence. In the 1960s, for 
 
50 Muḥammad Surūr’s Bio on his website. 
51 Meijer, “Introduction,” 9; Stéphane Lacroix, “Between Revolution and Apoliticism: Nasir al-Din al-
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example, Shaykh Muḥammad Nāsịr al-Dīn al-Albānī (1914-1999), a Syrian scholar of 
Albanian origin, taught at the University of Medina, but he had to leave after he criticized 
views against Wahhabism for upholding Hanbali madhab and thus engaging in taqlīd. 53 
His followers, who constitute the mainstream of Salafis, reject any form of engagement 
in political life and eschew participation in political parties. They view the political 
parties and movements as innovative, corruptive, and divisive of the belief of umma. 
Indeed, Shaykh al-Albānī and his followers condemn Islamist movements like the 
Muslim Brotherhood as sources of division and political deviations, accusing it of paying 
attention to politics over ʿilm (religious knowledge).54 
In the wake of the first Gulf War (1990), a new Salafi offshoot emerged in the 
form of a current known as the “Jamīs,” whose followers increasingly emphasized 
unyielding support for the Saudi royal family. Drawing their ideological and doctrinal 
thoughts from the teachings of Shaykh al-Albānī, the Jamīs or Madkhalīs (in reference to 
Shaykh Muḥammad Amān al-Jāmī and Shaykh Rabīʿ b. Hādī al-Madkhalī, two leading 
figures) arose as a response to the Ṣaḥwa, a politicized Salafī movement that had opposed 
the Saudi government’s decision to host American troops during the Gulf War. This 
emerging Salafi group are referred to as loyalist Salafīs, and at least in political matters, 
are aligned more with the Wahhābīs than other Salafīs. The Jāmīs share with other Salafīs 
a theological emphasis on eliminating what they regard as illegitimate religious 
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“innovations,” rejecting taqlīd, and promoting ijtihad, but they disagreed with others on 
matters of political quietism.55 
At the same time, other fissures opened up between mainstream Salafīs and 
dissident jihādī Salafī groups who advocated violence against what they saw as corrupt 
political regimes in the Muslim world and called for the re-establishment of the Islamic 
caliphate. Unlike mainstream Salafis, takfir (excommunication) and shirk (associating 
partners with Allāh) constitute the core principles of the creed of jihadī -Salafi groups 
such as al-Qaʿida. Like other Islamist movements, jihādī-Salafist groups have been 
profoundly inspired by the ideas of Sayyid Quṭb, especially the principles of jahiliyya 
(age of ignorance; the pre-Islamic society) and ḥakimiyya (sovereignty/governance of 
God). Academic researchers trace the emergence of the jihadī trend within Salafism to 
the 1980s war in Afghanistan when thousands of Muslims engaged in the Afghan war 
against the Soviet Union.56 
In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, where most of the attackers were 
from Saudi Arabia, Saudi officials have sought to eliminate perceptions that the attacks 
are connected with their adherence to Wahhābīsm by defecting blame to the imported 
ideologies of political Islamist movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood. More 
recently, in his ambitious effort to improve the country’s image, the powerful Crown 
Prince, Muhammad bin Salman, said in an interview with Time magazine that Surūris, 
who took their inspiration from Muhammad Surūr, are “ahead a little bit within the 
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Muslim Brotherhood, viewing things more extremely in the Middle East.” Despite their 
emphasis on non-violent political engagement, the Crown Prince added, “but in our law 
they are criminals and whenever we have enough evidence against any one of them, they 
will face a court.”57 With this statement, Ibn Salman is trying to re-direct blame for 
terrorism, violence, and extremism away from Wahhābīsm—the usual culprit identified 
in international discourses—and toward Surūri ideology instead.  
Historiography 
In the aftermath of the 1900 Gulf War, a body of literature emerged to discuss 
Islamist criticism of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for inviting foreign forces on its soil. 
Islamist dissent has been examined by several works that explore its origins, offer 
detailed biographies of prominent Saudi figures, record their discourses, and note their 
political activities in opposition to the Saudi government, as we shall discuss below. 
However, the scholarship about the ideology of the Ṣaḥwa movement and the figures who 
influenced it is sparse. Muḥammad Surūr’s influence on the Ṣaḥwa and his role in 
founding the Surūri group which dominated the social and political scene in Saudi Arabia 
for almost 20 years has received little attention from researchers.58 
In Saudi Arabia and the Politics of Dissent, for example, Mamoun Fandy surveys 
the ideas and political ideologies of the six most important Islamist Saudi dissident 
 
57 Muhammad Ibn Salman, “Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman Talks to TIME About the Middle East, 
Saudi Arabia’s Plans and President Trump,” Time, April 6, 2018, http://time.com/5228006/mohammed-bin-
salman-interview-transcript-full/.  
58 There are some exceptions who do briefly examine Surur: Lacroix, Awakening Islam, 69-70; Madawi Al-
Rasheed, Contesting the Saudi State: Islamic Voices from a new Generation, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007), 73-77; Gilles Kepel, The War for Muslim Minds: Islam and the West, trans. 
Pascale Ghazaleh (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2004), 176-177.  
23 
 
leaders in the 1990s, who mostly participated in non-violent political opposition. He 
provides a rich empirical base, documenting the vast literature produced by the prominent 
figures (lectures and writings) and their use of the latest technologies: videos, cassettes, 
and the Internet. Fandy discusses two key figures in the Ṣaḥwa movement usually 
described as Surūris, Salmān al-ʿAwda and Safar al-Ḥawālī, who expressed their 
opposition to the Saudi regime’s alliance with the West in many sermons during the Gulf 
War.59 His account also includes the dissidents in exile, Saʿd al al-Faqīh and Muḥammad 
al-Masʿari, who added a “cyberspace” aspect to classic exile politics in London, and the 
Shīʿite leader Sheikh Ḥasan al-Saffar.60 He also discusses the role of Osama bin Laden, 
who adopted a more violent approach in sponsoring terrorist acts against Americans in 
Saudi Arabia, Uganda, and Tanzania.61 In his book, Fandy adopts a biographical 
approach that focuses on analyzing their ideas of each Islamist figure rather than 
indicating the historical factors or influences that led to the rise of those Islamist ideas 
and leaders in the first place. 
Other scholars have explained the rise of Islamist political opposition against the 
Saudi monarchy in the 1990s in terms of an amalgam of domestic and foreign factors. On 
the domestic level, one factor that most scholars emphasize is the slide of oil prices, 
which affected living standards and led to cuts in all welfare programs for Saudi Arabian 
citizens, providing an opening to Islamist opponents of the state. Another factor included 
the social incongruities of the Kingdom and, according to the political scientist Hrair 
Dekmejian, “the impact of modernization and the spread of Western cultural 
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influences.”62 The final reasons on the domestic level were the growth in the graduates 
from Islamic universities who became the backbone of the religious resurgence and the 
role of charismatic religious figures like Safar al-Ḥawālī and Salmān al-ʿAwda, key 
figures in the Sahwa movement.63 On the international front, in the 1980s, the Saudi 
kingdom became vulnerable to the threat of Iran’s ambitions to become the leader of the 
Islamic world, Saddam Hussein’s expansionist ventures, and the presence of the U.S 
troops in Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf region, thereby contributing to the eruption 
of political dissent.64 
Most Arabic sources funded by the Saudi government or members of royal family 
portray the Surūrī jamāʿa and other Sahwi jamāʿat as tools of foreign religious influence, 
describing them as inflexible groups that used Islam to achieve their political and 
ideological aspirations or an Islamist seizure of power in the Kingdom.65 They accuse 
Surūr of laying the groundwork for violent jihādī groups like al-Qaʿida, arguing that he 
was one of the people who introduced the concept of ḥakimiyya, which leads to takfīr 
(excommunication) of all the regimes in the Arab world.66 
Recently, several scholars have begun to study the origins of Islamic opposition to 
the Saudi Kingdom going back to the early days in the 1950s and 1960s, looking for the 
roots of Islamic activism and identifying sources of the Ṣaḥwa movement’s political 
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orientation. In his book, The War for Muslim Minds: Islam and the West, Gilles Kepel 
reflects on Saudi official discourse, arguing that jihādi groups emerged from the Ṣaḥwa 
movement, which in turn was influenced by the ideology of Muslim Brotherhood 
expatriates in Saudi Arabia. He writes that “the phenomenon of Osama bin Laden and his 
associates cannot be understood outside this hybrid tradition. It is the offspring—
monstrous, natural, legitimate, depending on one’s point of view—of the marriage 
between local Wahhabism and international Islamist activism, facilitated at the highest 
echelons by the complicit meditation of the United States and Saudi Arabia.”67 While he 
indicates that “the [Egyptian and Syrian] Muslim Brotherhood obeyed the prohibition on 
proselytizing to Saudi subjects,” later, he seems to suggest the opposite, attributing the 
emergence of the Islamist political tendency and terrorism to the influence of Muslim 
Brotherhood members from Egypt and Syria.68 He argues that this would not have 
happened without the freedom to operate granted by the Saudi government.69 To support 
his argument, Kepel notes that Muḥammad Qutḅ supervised the dissertation of Safar al-
Ḥawālī, a prominent figure in the Ṣaḥwa movement, that focused on the ills of 
secularism. Muḥammad Surūr also taught Salmān al-ʿAwda as a teenager at the Scientific 
Institution in Buraydah.70 However, these two examples highlighted by Kepel alone do 
not provide strong evidence for the radicalization of the Saudi Arabian population by the 
Muslim Brotherhood; arguably, Wahhābī theology has played a much larger role with its 
focus on jihād and takfīr. 
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Meanwhile, in her landmark work, Contesting the Saudi State, Madawi al-
Rasheed also emphasizes the influence of external ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood on 
the Ṣaḥwīs. She argues that the Sahwis “rediscovered the revolutionary potential of 
Wahhabi religio-political discourse and articulated it in a modern language accessible to 
all.”71 In his book, Awakening Islam, Stéphane Lacroix provides a similar argument with 
an important qualification, contending that “although the Sahwa was at first partly the 
product of foreign influences, it thus acquired an endogenous character by producing its 
own identity and its own organizations.”72 In his analysis, Lacroix discusses the influence 
of the exiled members of the Muslim Brotherhood from Egypt and Syria, as well as the 
former member of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, Shaykh Muḥammad, Surūr, on the 
cohort of Saudi activists. 
Stéphane Lacroix’s book is one of the few accounts that examine the rise of 
Surūrism and its main figures. He discusses the jamāʿa in the context of what is called al-
Ṣaḥwa al-Islamiyya, the primary Islamist social trend that emerged in the 1960s as a 
combination of the Wahhābī creed and imported political ideas from the Muslim 
Brotherhood. He indicates that the Ṣaḥwa movement was represented by two main 
jamāʿat: the Ikhwān (the Muslim Brotherhood) and al-Surūriyyun (Surūrīs) who was the 
dominant Islamist.73 In the 1990s, the Ṣaḥwa trend was the only political group that 
opposed the Saudi Arabian regime. 
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The political thought of the Wahhābīs after the establishment of the Saudi 
Arabian Kingdom has been studied by several researchers recently. There is an 
agreement in this body of literature that political quietism permeated the discourse of the 
Wahhābī ʿulamāʾ: the ʿulamāʾ endorsed interpretations that promoted consent and 
obedience to the rulers. Peaceful or violent rebellion is forbidden, and the only political 
activity that the Wahhābī ʿulamāʾ may practice is providing advice to the ruler in 
secrecy.74 The Wahhābī political discourse and behavior continued unchallenged until the 
emergence of Ṣaḥwa movement in the 1970s. The rise of a new generation of ʿulamāʾ, 
the shaykhs of the Ṣaḥwa, not only undermined the political authority of the Saudi 
Arabian Kingdom, but also challenged the discourse of the traditional Wahhābī 
ʿulamāʾ.75 Madawi al-Rasheed states that they “were uncomfortable with the religio-
political aspect” of traditional Wahhābī tradition.76 
By the 1980s, the Ṣahwī ʿulamāʾ in Saudi Arabia specifically began to criticize 
the political discourse of the traditional Wahhābī ʿulamāʾ for focusing on the ritual 
aspects of religion and ignoring politics. The Surūris criticized the ʿulamāʾ for a lack of 
understanding of reality (fiqh al-wāqiʿ). The critique was identified by Stéphane Lacroix, 
who clarifies the meaning of the principle of fiqh al-wāqiʿ and how the Surūris used it to 
attack the ʿulamāʾ. He explains the criticism as resulting from the competition between 
the traditional Wahhābī circle and the Ṣaḥwī ʿulamāʾ: the young ʿulamāʾ did not have the 
access to the high positions in the religious apparatus such as the Senior ʿulamāʾ Council 
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and General Office for the Management of the Scientific Research, Fatwas, Preaching, 
and Guidance.77  
In the 1990s, fiqh al-wāqiʿ became one of the debatable points between the Surūr 
and other Ṣaḥwīs on one side and the Jāmīs, a new group of Salafīs, on the other side. 
Jāmīs launched a blistering critique against Surūrīs and Ṣaḥwīs for misusing the 
principle. In turn, Surūr and others responded to their attacks, which led to a heated 
debate between them. However, there is little follow up in existing literature about the 
impact of such debates and their recriminations. 
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Chapter 2 
Toward a New Synthesis in Saudi Arabia 
Muḥammad Surūr’s thought went through many stages before reaching its 
distinctive synthesis: blending the political awareness of the Muslim Brotherhood with 
the religious thought of the Wahhabis and creating an influential Islamic trend in Saudi 
Arabia and the Muslim world. This chapter examines the development of Surūr’s thought 
and its ideological framework. His outlook on Islam was shaped primarily by teachers 
who belonged to the Muslim Brotherhood, and early experiences in the ranks of the 
Syrian Muslim Brotherhood shaped his political awareness and commitment to 
organization and planning. The rise of national secular parties and the political 
polarization of the 1950s also comprised decisive factors in forming his ideological 
convictions. Examining the early period of Surūr’s life is crucial to understanding his 
subsequent career, as it shaped his Islamic path, political awareness and political and 
organizational experience. 
Furthermore, the chapter details the fine-grained distinctions between the Muslim 
Brotherhood, which is the most popular trend in political Islam, and political Salafists. 
Although both groups are categorized as Islamists, pursue the same goals, and have 
considerable interactions, they nevertheless diverge in terms of theology and praxis. This 
chapter, therefore, explains some of the most important theological and ideological 
distinctions between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafists. Particularly, Surūr 
criticized the Muslim Brotherhood’s focus on politics at the expense of religious 
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knowledge (ʿilm), thus spurning centralization and a hierarchic organizational structure 
for his group.  
To shed light on his early life and ideological shifts, we will examine Surūr’s 
writings in his magazine al-Sunnah, where he penned a series of articles talking about his 
experiences in the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood ranks, his embrace of Salafi ideology, and 
his activism in Saudi Arabia. “Murājaʿāt,” (Revisions), a series of seven recorded 
interviews with Surūr on Al-Hiwar channel, also offers further details of various aspects 
of his journey.  
Surūr’s Ikhwani Background 
As a youth, Surūr did not receive an intensive religious legal education. 
According to his own recollections, few educated people and experts in ʿilm al-sharʿi 
(religious legal knowledge) worked in his home region of the Ḥawrān area.78 Thus his 
Islamic education came mainly from lay teachers, many of whom were members of the 
Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. Most of his teachers did not originate from the Ḥawrān area, 
but from urban centers like Damascus or other nations like Palestine and Jordan. Shaykh 
Muḥammad Luṭfī al- Ṣabbāgh, a linguist, faqīh (an Islamic jurist), educator and an 
activist in the Muslim Brotherhood from Damascus, was one of Surūr’s teachers in 
middle school and an important early influence. In middle school, Surūr accompanied his 
teacher on trips to the towns and villages of Ḥawrān to deliver lectures and sermons.79  
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In his youth, Surūr witnessed the growth of Arab and Syrian nationalist feelings 
among the Arab population, especially in a rural area like Ḥawrān; political events and 
disputes played a significant role in forming his ideological awareness. From 
independence through the late 1960s, Syrian politics were marked by upheaval and 
repeated military coups. Political disputes and ideological conflicts between different 
players, including the Baʿth Party, Nasserites, Muslim Brotherhood, and Syrian Social 
Nationalist Party, dominated post-independence Syria. According to Surūr, student 
demonstrations proved instrumental in bringing down the military rulers in the 1950s, 
and these events often echoed across outlying areas of the country including Ḥawrān. 
Surūr stated that school students actively participated in the country’s political life and 
had a unique political consciousness. The conflicts of the time left a lasting imprint on 
Surūr, as he recounted that the heated partisan conflicts among students belonging to the 
Baʿth Party, the Muslim Brotherhood, and the Social Syrian Nationalist Party sometimes 
precipitated the suspension of study in schools in Ḥawrān for days at that time.80  
In 1953, at the age of fifteen, Surūr joined the Muslim Brotherhood, later 
explaining that the Muslim Brotherhood was “the only group that practices the daʿwa for 
God” in his area: “not associating with this group means the correlation with apostate 
jāhiliyya parties because the young people at that period were very interested in the 
politics, and they felt that partisan affiliation is necessary.”81 Young Surūr found a 
sanctuary in the Muslim Brotherhood from what he viewed as deviant thoughts of the 
nationalist parties and the corrupted environment of students. 
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When Surūr moved to Damascus in 1958 to pursue advanced studies, he had the 
opportunity to work under the mentorship of some of the Muslim Brotherhood’s most 
prominent leaders in Syria. He was heavily influenced by his professor Muṣṭafā al-Sibāʿī. 
Al-Sibāʿī (1915-1964), the founder and general guide (al-Murāqb al-ʿām) of the Syrian 
Muslim Brotherhood, was also the founder and dean of the college of Sharīʿa in 
Damascus who taught Surūr a personal status law course at the university. Surūr was 
keen to attend his lectures, sermons, and political campaigns, in the process becaming a 
strong advocate of Shaykh al-Sibāʿī’s ideas, especially the views he expressed in The 
Socialism of Islam that shocked even some Muslim Brotherhood members as too 
progressive.82 In his work, Al-Sibāʿī argued that with its social aspects, Islam teaches a 
unique type of socialism: it shares with socialism the same goals and emphasizes basic 
human rights: life, freedom, knowledge, dignity, and ownership.83 During this period, 
Surūr also learned about Salafi ideas. He was very close to the Damascus camp of the 
Muslim Brotherhood, among which included rising figures such as Zuhyr al-Shawīsh, 
Muḥammad Surūr, and Muḥammad al-ʿAbdeh who were influenced by the emergence of 
a more doctrinal and literalist version of Islam.84 
Surūr’s Adoption of Salafism and Break from the Muslim Brotherhood 
Surūr left Syria in 1965 as political activism became difficult under the repression 
of the Baʿth party, which seized power in March 1963; he decamped to Saudi Arabia and 
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commenced work as a teacher in the Scientific Institutes in Buraydah and Ḥāʾil and the 
Eastern Province.85 Upon his arrival in Saudi Arabia in 1965, Surūr continued his 
political engagement within the Muslim Brotherhood’s ranks. We do not know exactly 
the nature of Surūr’s religious identity during this early period. He was very far from 
being Ṣūfī (a Muslim mystic and ascetic) and never adopted a Ṣūfī order. He denied 
accusations that he was an Ashʿarī, (Asharite), or a follower of Ashʿariyyah, an Islamic 
theological school that uses reason in theological dispute on divine attributes and nature 
of the Qurʾān, instead professing his ignorance of such creeds.86 
We do know that Surūr’s religious outlook gradually shifted toward Salafism in 
Saudi Arabia. This adoption proved a turning point in the life of Muḥammad Surūr, as it 
propelled him toward his unique theological and political synthesis. Unlike many 
expatriates, the young teacher was impressed by the Saudi lifestyle at the time, especially 
by its simplicity. He also praised the religious establishment’s control of the country 
social life and enforcement of strict observance of Islamic traditions on a daily basis, 
such as closing businesses during working hours to facilitate prayers at mosques.87 
Unlike many other Muslim Brotherhood refugees, Sheikh Surūr also exuded an openness 
to influence and being influenced by the society around him. At the time of his arrival, he 
began teaching at the Scientific Institutions, a six-year religious school that prepares 
Saudi students for college founded in 1950 by the muftī Shaykh Muḥammad ibn Ibrahim 
ibn Abd al-Latif Al-Shaykh (1890– 1969). According to its official websites, the 
Scientific Institution set up “its curriculum based on the correct creed and manhaj of al-
 
85 Murājaʿāt with Surūr. 
86 Murājaʿāt with Surūr. 
87 Murājaʿāt. 
34 
 
salaf al-ṣālih (methodology of the righteous ancestors) and iʿtidāl (moderation) without 
ghulw (exaggeration) and jafāʾ (harshness).”88 Surūr thus joined the mainstream of the 
Saudi Salafī-cum-Wahhābī ideological religious system.  
Surūr found inspiration from the religious scientific tendency of the Salafī school 
and broader religious and scientific trends among the students of these Islamic 
educational institutions. Regretfully, he noted the absence of such a tendency among the 
Muslim Brotherhood in Syria “because of their preoccupation with politics.”89 The Salafī 
ideology appealed to him because of its emphasis on the superiority of ʿilm (religious 
knowledge); students in these schools showed an extraordinary interest in studying the 
religious sciences such as Ḥadīth, Qurʾānic exegesis, theology, and fiqh. Additionally, 
Surūr was attracted by the creed of Salafiyya that emphasized the purity of belief from 
bid’ (religious innovations) and from practices that deviate from the teachings of the 
Prophet and his companions, such as veneration of saints. Unlike many other Muslims, 
the Salafīs reject taqlīd (the following of the four canonical law schools) and emphasize 
ijtihād (individual interpretation.) Instead, they rely on dalīl (proof from the Qurʾān, 
Sunna of the Prophet and the consensus of the companions) as the basis of their 
opinion.90 Surūr believed that this ideology, which claims a return to the ʿaqīda (creed) 
and manhaj (Islamic method) of the al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ (pious ancestors), provided him with 
a more authentic model of belief and social action.91 
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After working with the Muslim Brotherhood for more than ten years, Surūr 
decided to break away and began to criticize the movement, even as he still bore the 
traces and influence of his previous association. After spending a few years in Saudi 
Arabia and under the influence of the Saudi religious circle, Surūr appreciated that “the 
daʿwa must be through the creed and methodology of al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ (pious ancestors).” 
However, many of his older Muslim Brotherhood compatriots did not share such an 
interest. He affirmed that “I tried to reconcile between my new convictions and my status 
within this group. But this is hard to achieve.”92 Surūr asserted that he could not 
compromise on doctrinal errors of the Muslim Brotherhood and tirelessly tried to correct 
false beliefs among its members.  
On the doctrinal level, Surūr criticized issues of theological and jurisprudence of 
the Muslim Brotherhood, condemning them for not adopting the Salafī creed (ʿaqīda) and 
methodology (manhaj).93 He disdained the organization for being deviant and shallow 
regarding religious knowledge and for its focus on politics at the expense of religious 
knowledge (ʿilm) and purifying the creed (ʿaqīda). Surūr considered the purification and 
correction of the creed of greater importance than a focus on politics. 
Surūr’s critiques of the Muslim Brotherhood not only emanated from doctrinal, 
methodological, or even political concerns, but also from disagreements on strategic 
actions. He criticized the recruitment strategy of the Muslim Brotherhood for accepting 
members regardless of their doctrinal background. Surūr also said he was fed up with the 
“policy of gathering,” by which he meant that the movement combined many contrasting 
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elements such as Ṣūfīs, Ashʿarīs, and Salafīs in one group. The policy had been 
developed by al-Bannā who believed that Muslims should abandon their divisions and 
wrote “we cooperate upon what we agree, and we excuse one another in what is 
disagreed upon.”94 For Surūr, gathering Muslims around a noble political aim—
establishment of an Islamic state—without considering the correctness of the creed 
amounted to a colossal mistake. 
Surūr also condemned the multi-faceted nature of the Muslim Brotherhood. Al-
Bannā perceived Islam as a “comprehensive system” that can apply in any political 
context. He transformed his vision of Islam to his movement and defined it as “a Salafi 
call, a Sunni way, a Sufi truth, a political organization, an athletic group, an intellectual 
and scientific association, an economic company, and a social idea.”95 Surūr declared that 
“such a mixture cannot be a basis for the unity of Islamic action. On the contrary, it leads 
only to rivalry and division because Ṣūfiism is an anomaly and deviation from the 
approach of the truth (manhaj al-Ḥaq.)”96  
Additionally, he criticized the centralization and a hierarchic organizational 
structure of the group. Surūr criticized rights that the Muslim Brotherhood conferred 
upon the leader of the movement that in practice made him an absolute ruler. According 
to the Muslim Brotherhood, obedience to the people who are in charge is part of 
obedience to God and the Prophet. The leader of the association thus enjoyed the same 
rights as the Khalifa of the Muslims, including listening and obedience and taking bayʿah 
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(allegiance). Surūr lamented that these rights make the Brotherhood leader “a tyrannical 
dictator.”97  
Surūr mocked the Muslim Brotherhood leaders, saying they practiced absolute 
rule within the group while being fascinated by democracy. Surūr felt frustrated by the 
leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood for gathering people around the political goal of 
establishing an Islamic state, then rejecting offers to take high positions in the 
government on the pretext of illegitimate way. After ten years in the ranks of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, he found out that “the goals and objectives they talked about were a mirage 
because they missed a historic opportunity to reach power because the leaders were 
fascinated by democracy until others from the enemies of God came and took advantage 
of the opportunity.”98  
Furthermore, Surūr condemned the stance of the Muslim Brotherhood for its 
support of the Iranian revolution in 1979 and for siding with the Iranians in the Iraq-Iran 
War. He described its attitude as “emotional, devoid of reading the events and its result.” 
He added that none of the Islamists who welcomed the Iranian revolution ever read about 
the beliefs of Shīʿites “Rāfiḍah” (rejectors), the term Surūr and many others applied to 
Shīʿites because they do not recognize the first three Khalifs as the legitimate successors 
of Prophet Muhammad and hold Ali as to be the first successor.99 
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99 ʿAbd Allāh al-Gharīb [pseudonym of Muḥammad Surūr Zayn al-ʿĀbidīn], Muḥammad Surūr Zayn al-
ʿĀbidīn, Wa-jāʼa dawr al-Majūs: al-abʻād al-tārīkhīyya wa al-ʻAqāʼidīyya wa-al-siyāsīyya lil-thawrah al-
Irānīyya [Then Came the Turn of Majūs: the historical, doctrinal, and political dimensions of Iranian 
Revolution], tenth edition, 9-10. available on his Website, www.surour.net. first published in Cairo by Dar 
al-Ajyal Li-ltibaʿa (1402 H.) [1981]. 
38 
 
Finally, Surūr bitterly condemned the Syrian Muslim brotherhood after the 
Ḥamāh massacre in February 1982 for entering into the National Alliance for Liberation 
of Syria along with the dissident Baʿth faction led by notable archrivals of the Hafiz al-
Assad regime, Amīn al- Ḥafiz and Michel ʿAflaq, as well as the Arab Socialist Party of 
Akram al-Ḥawrānī and other secular groups in exile. The brotherhood’s move put them in 
opposition to the Fighting Vanguard, a splinter Islamist armed group which fought 
against the regime.100 Surūr deemed the coalition of the Muslim Brotherhood with “the 
infidel apostate parties” that did not share the same goals of implementing the Sharīʿa 
illegitimate. He argued that although the leaders of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood who 
held the agreement sought to find interpretations from sīrah (biography of Prophet 
Muḥammad) and fiqh to support their efforts, there is no proof justifying such a coalition. 
He added that in the past, there had been many efforts to work and cooperate with 
secularists; however, the previous attempts had been shown to fail.101 He expressed 
surprise over the seeming contradiction that the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood would “fight 
against a wing of the Baʿth Party and ally with another wing of Baʿth Party.” The Syrian 
exile also expressed astonishment that the Brotherhood could achieve a coalition and 
work with figures such as Michel ʿAflaq who, according to Surūr, is one of many “Abū 
Jahl of this era.”102 With this statement, Surūr is comparing Michel ʿAflaq, the founder of 
the Baʿth Party that seized power in 1963 in Syria and subjected the Muslim Brotherhood 
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101 Muḥammad Surūr Zayn al-ʿĀbidīn, “Munāqishat Shubuhāt al-Mutahaālifiyyn maʿ al-ʿAlmāniyyn wa al-
Murtadiyyn” [Discussion the Misconceptions of those who allied with the Secularist and Apostates] al-
Sunnah 5 (1411 H.) (August 1990): 94.  
102 Ibid., 94-95. 
39 
 
to ruthless repression, with Abū Jahl, one of the greatest persecutors of the early Muslims 
in Mecca. 
This marked rupture with the Muslim Brotherhood over doctrinal and political 
differences also likely stemmed, at least in part, from Surūr’s exposure to and interaction 
with various Saudi subjects. Despite their role in the modernization process in Saudi 
Arabia, the Saudi government prohibited expatriate Muslim Brotherhood members from 
political and religious proselytization to Saudis. This restriction was clearly aimed at 
preventing any attempt to challenge the religious domination of the Wahhabi 
establishment and forestalling friction or confrontation between the Muslim Brotherhood 
and local religious leaders. Generally, Muslim Brotherhood members in the Kingdom 
obeyed the orders that required them to refrain from any political activities with Saudi 
subjects. However, the ambitious Surūr challenged these strictures and met with Saudis, 
who were influenced by his political ideas and became the backbone of the Ṣaḥwa. 
Surūr’s activities caused, in his own words, “a heated war” with the Ikhwān (the Muslim 
Brotherhood), which became the main reason for leaving the group, as we shall see 
below.103  
Surūr’s criticism of the Muslim Brotherhood and adaptation of Salafiyya led to 
animosity with other Muslim Brotherhood expatriates, a break which had an enduring 
and painful personal consequences. According to Surūr, after leaving the Muslim 
Brotherhood, he was subjected to “harassment and hostility” by the former group, stating 
“I do not think that anyone in the Muslim world was wronged by his brothers and former 
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companions as much as I was.”104 According to Surūr, the representative of the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Saudi Arabia and the principle mediator between that group and the Saudi 
government, Mannāʿ al-Qattān, played the decisive role in his ultimate expulsion from 
the nation. Al-Qattān informed the Saudi authorities about Surūr’s activities, asking them 
to end his contract and then to deport him from the kingdom. Surūr recounted that al-
Qattān told him that “your presence in this country harms us.”105 
Establishing His Own Path and Movement 
After separating from the Muslim Brotherhood, Surūr decided to start his own 
distinct group and theological orientation. Surūr created a new synthesis which combined 
a vigorous commitment to the Salafī creed with the Muslim Brotherhood’s political 
ambition of seizing power and enforcing Sharīʿa through state control. His activism took 
place within Salafī circles and was directed toward gaining a foothold within it. 
Furthermore, he adopted a new set of epistemological assumptions that defined his future 
activism. Henceforth, Surūr still obviously reflected his early career in the Muslim 
Brotherhood in some respects, but he also became decisively Salafī in others. During this 
period, Surūr established his hybrid ideology as an influential trend in Saudi Arabia 
during the 1980s and 1990s.  
Since his thought played a crucial role in the development of the eponymous 
Surūrī group and the broader Ṣaḥwa movement in general, it is important to discuss his 
philosophy. The cornerstone of Surūr’s new guiding assumptions for Islamic activism is 
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adherence to the ʿaqīda and manhaj of the al-salaf al-ṣalīḥ, by which he meant 
understanding and practicing Islam in the same way of the first three generations of pious 
Muslims.106 A central feature of his religious thought is his affirmation that Islam 
comprises a total system, with politics component a part of this system, and cannot be 
ignored. He wrote that “calling for the implementation of the Islamic Sharīʿa is one of the 
most important issues and problems of this time. The conditions of Muslims will not 
settle unless they submit to God’s orders in every aspect in their life. The acceptance of 
the jāhilī laws is one of the nullifications of Islam.”107 He asserted that the call for 
implementation of Sharīʿa should be consistent with the creed of the al-salaf al-ṣalīḥ.108  
Despite the influence of his ideas, Surūr exhibited a reticence to play the role of 
the leader of the new group because he did not see himself as “ʿālim mujtahid” 
(independent jurist: one who can formulate an independent decision on legal and 
theological matters), and because he did not want to “burden the reformist renewal 
project with the responsibility for [his] previous mistakes.” Additionally, he believed that 
the competition for leadership is one of the most serious problems facing the Islamic 
umma: the preacher should only provide his experiences and talents and keep away from 
the reins.”109 He also refused to give the new entity a name, because such a moniker 
would inevitably lead toward partisan fanaticism (taʿaṣṣub), which becomes the main 
obstacle to Islamic unity.110 
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Surūr is known for his influence in the broader Ṣaḥwa movement that was colored 
by his synthetic ideology in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Through his communications 
and meeting with local people, Surūr observed that the Islamic current among the Saudis 
lacked “the comprehensive sense that makes the Muslim have an Islamic impression over 
everything.”111 In other words, he recognized the lack of political activism among  
religious circles in Saudi Arabia, which were dominated by the Salafis and Wahhabis. 
Infusing politics within the Wahhābī and Salafī lines was not an easy task, given the 
purist and non-political stance of most of Wahhabis and Salafī strains, which emphasize 
that politics is the main source of division within the Islamic community. It is important 
to note that these two groups are in agreement on various matters, including eschewing 
politics and criticizing Islamists movement for not adopting the creed and manhaj of the 
Salaf. Surūr was aware that the domination of the Wahhābī tradition was unassailable in 
his host country. By adopting a Salafī path, he was able to penetrate the conservative 
community and promote his emphasis on political orientation.  
As a teacher in the Scientific Institutions, Surūr inspired his students, some of 
whom became the leaders of the Ṣaḥwa movement. Shaykh Salmān al-ʿAwda, a key 
figure of the Ṣaḥwa, for example, was one of his students in the Scientific Institution in 
Burayda.112 Certainly, Dr. al-ʿAwda was influenced directly or indirectly by Surūr’s 
synthesis. Surūr’s meeting with the Saudi subjects was also an important factor in 
spreading the Ṣaḥwa movement. In these gatherings, Saudis would be introduced to the 
concept of al- ḥakimiyya (rule of God, sovereignty), the fundamental demand of the 
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Muslim Brotherhood. Furthermore, Surūr would talk about engagement in the partisan 
wars and opposing “the secular invasion” in Syria.113 Surūr’s political thoughts circulated 
among young Saudis, who found his political discourse more inspirational than the 
traditional Wahhābī ʿulamāʾ, whose teaching was limited to extirpating deviant religious 
practice and whose political preaching was confined only to calls for total obedience to 
the walī al-amr.  
Within a short time, Surūr was able to build extensive public relation networks, 
not only on the areas where he worked but also in the whole kingdom.114 Eager to learn 
more about the modern world, the young generation undoubtedly also gathered around 
Shaykh Surūr for the experience and organizational capabilities that he had acquired 
through his membership in the Muslim Brotherhood. Under his influence, al-Surūriyya 
(Surūrism) gained an important foothold by the late 1960s and early 1970s, soon 
dominating the intellectual and religious spectrum of Saudi Arabia between the 1980s 
and 1990s.   
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Chapter 3 
Surūr: The Champion of Modern Anti-Shīʿism 
After his expulsion from Saudi Arabia and relocation to Kuwait in 1973, Surūr 
took a new interest in studying Shīʿism. Shīʿites constitute a significant minority in 
Kuwait, and Surūr visited the ḥusayniyyat (congregation halls for Twelver Shīʿa Muslims 
commemoration ceremonies, especially the mourning of Muḥarram and Battle of 
Karbala), engaged in debates with Shīʿite imams, and met with exiled figures from the 
Ḥizb al-Daʿwa al-Islāmiyya, an Iraqi Shīʿī political party. Through his examination of the 
situation in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Iran, as well as his reading of Khomeini’s writings 
and activities years before the Iranian Revolution, Surūr developed firm anti-Shīʿa 
convictions that would provide the basis for a book, Wa jāʼa dawr al-Majūs [Then Came 
the Turn of Majūs (Zoroastrians)], that was published under pseudonym in 1981. He was 
one of the early polemicists who criticized the Iranian Revolution and warned against the 
threat of Shīʿite domination of the Middle East. While anti-Shīʿī rhetoric was certainly 
not unique to Surūr, his writings played his significant role in modernizing and 
popularizing it by adding ethnic and political aspects. His writings were distinguished by 
the addition of an ethnic dimension to his theological broadside, noting Persians’ betrayal 
of the Islamic state from the early period of Islam to the modern day, stating that they 
were the impetus for many uprisings and heretical groups. 
Along with his anti-Shīʿa thoughts from the Wahhābīs and Salafis, who see 
Shīʿism as a deviant sect, Surūr expressed a more political version of anti-Shīʿism, 
including doubt about the aspirations of the Islamic Republic of Iran and its alliance with 
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the “ʿAlawī Syrian regime.” The political context of his homeland of Syria, and 
especially the repression experienced by the Muslim Brotherhood under the Nusayri 
(ʿAlawī) Syrian regime, clearly informed this anti-Shīʿī treatise and contributed to special 
criticism of Syria’s Nusayris (ʿAlawis). Geopolitics and great power competition 
continually appear in the text as Surūr argued that the Iranians, like their Persian 
ancestors, had national ambitions in the neighboring Arab countries and sought to control 
the region with the help of the Arab Shīʿite, who were seen by Surūr as a “fifth column.” 
Soon after the revolution, Khomeini and his followers began talking about exporting the 
Islamic revolution to other Islamic countries that are under secular corrupted regimes. 
Surūr understood the aim of these announcements as Persian rafidas’ aspirations to 
dominate the other side of the Gulf and Iraq by overthrowing the current regimes and 
creating Shīʿī -dominated states. 
Surūr stated that he began writing the book in 1976 and completed a few chapters 
before the Iranian revolution. After following Khomeini’s writings and activities for a 
long time, he said that it was clear that the cleric would play a leading role in Iran’s 
future. He mentioned that the idea for the book did not stem only from the danger posed 
by the Iranian revolution, but also from Arab Shīʿites, who started to build close links 
with the Iranian regime from the time of the Shah and who took power in Syria.115 Surūr 
published Wa-jāʼa dawr al-Majūs in 1981 under the pseudonym of ʿAbd Allāh 
Muḥammad al-Gharīb when he was in Kuwait. The term majūs means Zoroastrians, and 
in the early Islamic period, it translated to fire-worshippers. Surūr used the term in a 
derogatory way and deployed it against Iranian Shīʿites to cast them as ersatz Muslims. 
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As discussed in detail below, the book, which became very influential between the 1980s 
and 1990s, warned of an Iranian Shīʿite plan to control the Middle East. He attacked the 
Iranian Revolution and Khomeini, in process warning of the “Persian Majūsī rāfiḍī” 
expansion into the Gulf, Iraq and the Levant, adding ethnic and political aspects to 
modern anti-Shīʿism.  
Surūr faced challenges in printing and distributing his anti-Shīʿite book. The book 
was universally rejected by all the publishing houses in Kuwait and other Gulf states 
because of its content. The book was only published in Egypt by a publishing house 
owned by a Coptic Christian, but after the printing of the book, the Egyptian authorities 
refused to release it until receiving permission from the rectors at al-Azhar University, 
and even then, rejected distributing the book in Egypt. According to Surūr, he was able to 
get the permission of al-Azhar through connections, perhaps without anyone actually 
reviewing the book.116 In the beginning, the book was banned across the entire Arab 
world. At the time, however, the Wahhābī ʿulamāʾ in Saudi Arabia gathered to take a 
stand on the Iranian Revolution. After one ʿalim suggested the book included all the 
information they need to make their stance, however, the book gained the acceptance of 
the Wahhābī establishment. Then, Shaykh Abdul Aziz bin Bāz, Grand Mufti of Saudi 
Arabia, decided to buy three thousand copies and distributed the book to his surrounding 
circle before lifting the ban on the book in the Kingdom.117  
 
116 Muḥammad Surūr Zayn al-ʿĀbidīn, Wa-jāʼa dawr al-Majūs: al-abʻād al-tārīkhīyya wa al-ʻAqāʼidīyya wa-
al-siyāsīyya lil-thawrah al-Irānīyya [Then Came the Turn of Majūs: the historical, doctrinal, and political 
dimensions of Iranian Revolution], 11, 10th edition, available on https://surour.net/. The first edition was 
published under a pseudonym, Al-Gharīb, ʻAbd Allāh Muḥammad in Cairo by Dar al-Ajyal Li-ltibaʿa in 1981. 
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After the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war, the book gained even greater notoriety 
and influenced other anti-Shīʿa polemicists who saw the Shīʿa as a political threat; 
subsequently, the ban on the text was lifted in most countries. Kuwait was one of the few 
countries that did not lift the ban because of fear of provoking its significant Shīʿa 
minority. Although penned under a pseudonym, the book was a source of danger for 
Surūr because the authorities sought to punish those who held the book, and it was a 
principal reason for his departure from Kuwait in 1984.118 
Throughout Wa-jāʼa dawr al-Majūs, Surūr vehemently embraces anti-Shīʿi 
rhetoric and promotes the idea that Khomeini’s pan-Islamic rhetoric constituted a 
harbinger of imminent Shīʿī invasion and the “Shīʿite Persian menace” of Sunni lands. 
One of the earliest opponents to warn against Khomeini and his rule before the Iran-Iraq 
war, Surūr wrote that “Khomeini is more malicious than the Shah.”119 In the book, he 
expresses views about the Iranian Revolution that diverged from mainstream Islamists. 
He criticizes the statement of the International Organization of the Muslim Brotherhood 
welcoming the Iranian revolution and the position of the International Organization 
supporting the Iranian side in the Iran–Iraq War. Surūr particularly lambastes the 
Brotherhood for what he described as an emotional, theoretical position devoid of an 
actual reading of events on the ground.120 He also condemns the attitude of other 
Islamists who admired the revolution in Iran, including Abūʾl-Aʿlā Mawdūdī, a Pakistani 
Muslim theologian and founder of the Islamist political organization called Jamaat-e-
Islami. Surūr argues that no one who supported the Iranian revolution read about the 
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“aberration and deviations” beliefs of Shīʿites rāfiḍa.121 In sum, Surūr deplores the 
ignorance of those Islamists who welcomed the Iranian Revolution and called for 
cooperation with Khomeini.122 Throughout the book, Surūr refers to Khomeini and his 
fellow Iranians as Persians to demonstrate the nationalist ambitions of Khomeini’s ideas, 
in opposition to the Islamic solidarity that the revolutionaries alleged to advocate. Surūr 
sometimes does not differentiate between the Twelver Shīʿa and other Shīʿa sects such as 
Alawis and Ismaʿlis.  
While anti- Shīʿī rhetoric was certainly not unique to Surūr, as noted above, his 
writings were distinguished by the addition of an ethnic dimension to his theological 
broadside. Surūr chronicles the Persians’ betrayal of the Islamic state from the early 
period of Islam to the modern day, stating that they were the impetus for many uprisings 
and heretical groups. Surūr claims that after the Muslim conquest of Persia in 633–654, 
the majūs Persians converted to Islam only to undermine it from within: to orchestrate 
conspiracies against Muslims that would eventually destroy their religion. According to 
Surūr, the first attempt of majūs to achieve revenge against Muslims was the 
assassination of the second Khalifa ʿUmar, who they hated because he was behind the 
demise of their rule in the Sassanian kingdom and the destruction of their glory.123 
Killing ʿUmar was a majūsi Christian plot perpetrated by a Christian Persian captive 
brought to Medina, Abū Luʾluʾah al-Majūsi. Their campaign against the Khalifa ʿUmar 
continued after his murder by cursing him, in accordance with the practices of Shīʿism.124 
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Surūr claimed that Persians converted to Shīʿī Islam because of the compatibility of their 
old Zoroastrian beliefs with Shīʿism in terms of the veneration and unyielding submission 
to a holy family.125 He adds that the Zoroastrians converted to Shīʿī Islam because they 
thought that Shīʿī Islam was derived from the Sassanian royal family: Ḥusayn, the 
grandson of Prophet Muḥammad and the third Shīʿa Imām, had married a Sassanian 
princess whose son became the fourth Imām.126 
Surūr continued to see such suspect Persian machinations at work in the 
ʿAbbāsids overthrow of the Umayyads in 750 and efforts to control the new Khalifate. 
According to Surūr, Abū Muslim al- Khurasānī, a Persian general and the leader of the 
ʿAbbāsid Revolution, began to look on the Caliph with disdain and exercised absolute 
power, even aspiring to appropriate the Caliph’s position for himself.127 Like Abū 
Muslim al- Khurasānī, the Persian al-Barāmikah family enjoyed considerable influence 
under the early ʿAbbāsids, and according to the Syrian political activist, other Persian 
figures sought to control Caliphs through intermarriage.  
Surūr also contends that the endeavors of the Persians were not limited to efforts 
to influence and control the caliphs; their impact penetrated several other areas. During 
the ʿAbbāsid era, the Persians orchestrated many heretical movements that advocated the 
“Manichaean doctrines.” Surūr gives an example of the rebellion of Al-Muqannaʿ, a 
religious leader who carried out a revolt against the ʿAbbāsid caliph al-Mahdī and called 
for the “al-ḥulūl” (incarnation).128 He adds that Persians attempted to distort Islamic 
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history and fabricate aḥadīth of the Prophet Muḥammad. They also sought to disparage 
and criticize the al-Ṣaḥāba (Companion of Prophet Muhammad) such as Abū Bakr al-
Siddīq and ʿUmar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb. During this time, Surūr laments the Persians returned to 
their old perceptions and customs, such as wearing turbans and celebrating majūsi 
holidays like Nowruz.129 
Surūr notes that ʿAbbāsid authority began to deteriorate in the third century when 
Persian Shīʿa established independent “small states” across the broader Middle East in 
Iraq, Iran, the Levant, and Egypt. These states were “aiming to keep Muslims away from 
their religion…, to destroy the Islamic Caliphate, and to provoke ethnic tensions.”130 He 
asks by what coincidence were the ethnic ancestors of the Qarāmiṭa (Qarmatians), the 
ʿUbydiyyūn (Fatimids), the Būyahiyyūn (Buyids) all of Persian origins.131 He also points 
out that the states of Qarāmiṭa 278 H (891 G), Fāṭimīyūn 296 H (909 G), Būyahiyīyūn 
(Buyids) 334 H (945 G) were established in a relatively short time span, and their 
doctrines were similar to the doctrines of Mani, Mazdak, and Zoroaster.132 For instance, 
the Buyid dynasty, a Shīʿa Persian dynasty, “conquered Iraq in 334H (946 G), deposed 
the ʿAbbāsid caliph” of Baghdad, attempted to enforce their particular religious view 
upon their subjects, and “instigated sectarian strife between the Sunnis and Shīʿa.”133 In 
Surūr’s view, the Persian majūs continued their plots and fighting against the ʿAbbāsid 
Caliphate, spreading “al-kufr” (unbelief) and “al-Zandaqa” (heresy) until “Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn 
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al-Ayyūbi came and cleansed the Levant and Egypt from majūsism, and returned the 
Prophet’s sunnah to the Muslims.”134 
Surūr argues that although these early states disappeared, their doctrines and 
conceptions persisted in the beliefs of some Shiʿī bāṭinī groups that focus on an inner, 
esoteric (bāṭin) meaning in the interpretation of religious texts. Surūr uses the term here 
pejoratively, and argues that, after the demise of these states, bāṭinī groups continued to 
be involved in clandestine activities: 
The bāṭinīs were preparing themselves to come out of their burrows with their old 
beliefs, which they changed only the names: the Ṣafawīs (Safavids), the Bahāʾīs, 
the Qadyānīs (Ahmadis), the Durūz (Druze), the Nuṣayrīs (ʿAlawīs), the 
Ḥashashūn Ismāʿīlīs (Assassins). The bāṭinīs have returned to their normal role ... 
to support the enemies of Allāh and to cooperate with them against Muslims. 
They cooperated with Britain, Portugal, France, and Tsarist Russia. They returned 
to tear the Islamic unity again.135 
Surūr claims that all these groups belonged to Shiʿī origins and that the founders of these 
sects including the Durūz and the Nuṣayrīs (ʿAlawīs), centered primarily in the 
geographic land of Levant, were majūs Persians.136 
The political context of his homeland of Syria, and especially the repression 
experienced by the Muslim Brotherhood under the Nuṣayrī (ʿAlawī) Syrian regime, 
clearly informed this anti-Shiʿī treatise and contributed to special criticism of Syria’s 
Nuṣayrīs (ʿAlawīs). An early example of the Shīʿa bāṭinī sects, the Nuṣayrīs (ʿAlawīs) 
were founded by Muḥammad ibn Nuṣayr, who emerged first as an Imāmī Shīʿī. Surūr 
claims that Ibn Nuṣayr was the first to conceive “the idea of the occulted Imām,” adding 
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that Ibn Nuṣayr claimed that he is “the bāb” (door) of the occulted Imām, the intimate 
disciple of the Imām.137 The Nuṣayrīs, likewise, believe in “transmigration of souls, the 
eternity of the world, deny the resurrection and propagation, deny paradise and hell.” He 
writes that they also believe that “Alī is the rabb (Lord), Muḥammad is the ḥijāb (veil) 
and Salmān is the bāb (door). Iblīs al-Abālisa [the king of the devils] … is ʿUmar ibn al-
Khatṭāḅ and below him in the rank of the devils is Abū Bakr and then ʿUthmān, may God 
be pleased with them all.”138  
Continuing from this theological critique to more specifically political 
accusations, Surūr levels charges of treason against the ʿAlawīs for aiding the Christians, 
the Tatars, and the French against the Muslims to occupy the Levant. Additionally, he 
criticizes the actions and behavior of the Nuṣayrīs in the present. He writes that “they 
control an important part of the Levant- Syria- and plan to eradicate Islam and Muslims if 
the atmosphere is clear for them, and cooperate with Israel, Iran, and the United States of 
America, and the Islamic scholars in the present and the past have agreed upon kufr 
(heresy) of this sect.”139 Clearly, Surūr wants to stress the treacherous and heretical 
nature of the sect in the history and provides a timely warning against what he perceived 
as the expansionist aspiration of the ʿAlawīs in his own time. 
In the second part of the book, Surūr reviews doctrines of the Shīʿites in the past 
and present. The Salafī and Wahhābī influence of Surūr’s anti-Shīʿa thoughts is clearly 
present in this part of the book. It is important to note that Salafis and Wahhabis provide 
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the intellectual and religious groundworks of religious anti-Shīʿism. This part discusses 
the doctrinal and religious error of the Shīʿa, arguing that Shī‘a believe in the idea of 
altering the Qurʾān’s text. He criticizes Shīʿites on numerous points, including for their 
contradiction of the Sunna, for believing in ʿiṣmah (immunity from sin, infallibility) of 
the Twelve Imāms, for sabb al-Ṣaḥāba (cursing the Companions of the Prophet 
Muhammad), for the endorsement in jaʿfari law of mutʿa (temporary marriage), and for 
the Shīʿī theory and practice of taqiyya (dissimulation of the real religious belief and 
practice in the face of persecution.)140 
Surūr goes on to argue that the Shīʿites of modern times are more dangerous to 
Islam than the Shīʿites of the past.141 In the first half of the twentieth century, there were 
efforts by Shīʿa and Sunni figures to reach a kind of rapprochement between their two 
communities. For this purpose, newspapers, magazines, and associations were established 
by both sides. However, all these attempts largely failed.142 Surūr blames the Shīʿa for the 
failure of these efforts because their ʿulamāʾ continued publishing books cursing the 
Companions of the Prophet Muḥammad.143 Pointing to the concept of taqiyya, he 
condemns the Shīʿa as untrustworthy and questioned their intentions in calling for 
rapprochement and unity between Sunnis and Shīʿa. To Surūr, the Shīʿa adopted such a 
conciliatory posture only as mask to implement their plans of disseminating Shīʿism 
among Sunnis.144 He mentions the experience of Shaykh Muṣṭafā al-Sibāʿī and others, 
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who participated in such efforts, citing their unpleasant comments.145 Surūr concludes 
that the only way to achieve unity between the Sunnis and Shīʿa is “to get rid of their 
polytheism and idolatry.”146 
Surūr claims that through studying the history and doctrines of the Shīʿa, as well 
as observing their news, he recognized that Iranian clerks organize the affairs of their co-
religionists around in the world, who are first and foremost loyal to the political and 
religious leadership in Iran, whether the ruler is the Shah or Khomeini. He also contends 
that the dispute between the Shah and Khomeini did not have a significant impact on 
members of the sect outside Iran.147 He notes that “the Nuṣayrī regime in Syria had close 
connections with the deposed Iranian Shah and his regime, and these connections have 
become closer and stronger with the new revolution led by Khomeini.”148 Surūr claims 
that Muḥammad ibn Nuṣayr is of Persian origin and that the Nuṣayrī doctrines are similar 
to the majūs ones. Therefore, he assumes that “the correlation of the Nuṣayrīs to Iran is 
ethnic on one hand and doctrinal on the other.”149 There are no differences between the 
Shah and Khomeini’s “foreign affairs and Persian aspirations on the neighboring 
countries.” Like the Shah, “the leaders of the Khomeini revolution” claimed that the three 
UAE islands are Iranian, the Gulf is Persian, and “demanded to annex Bahrain, Iraq, 
Mecca, Medina, and Southern Lebanon. They sought to create a great Shīʿite empire that 
extends to all Islamic countries under leadership of an Iranian murshid.”150 Clearly, Surūr 
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is asserting that the political loyalty and religious authority of Arab Shīʿites is to Iran and 
not their countries of residence, thus insisting upon the expansionist nature of the 
Persians of Iran whether ruled by the Shah or Khomeini. 
Geopolitics and great power competition continually appear in the text, as Surūr 
argues that the Iranians, like their Persian ancestors, had national ambitions in 
neighboring Arab countries and sought to control the region with the help of the Arab 
Shīʿites. Soon after the revolution, Khomeini and his followers began talking about 
exporting the Islamic revolution to other Islamic countries under corrupted secular 
regimes.151 Surūr understands the aim of these announcements as Persian rāfiḍas’ 
aspirations to dominate the other side of the Gulf and Iraq by overthrowing the current 
regimes and creating Shiʿī-dominated states. Ayatollah Ṣādiq Ruhānī, an Iranian marja 
(religious authority), called for the annexation of Bahrain to Iran, renewing the historical 
Persian demand for sovereignty over these areas. Surūr adds that the ambition of the 
Persians in Bahrain and Iraq is traced back not only to the time of the Shah but also to 
their pre-Islamic “majūs Persian ancestors.”152 After the victory of the Islamic 
Revolution, these calls increased under the pretext of exporting the Islamic revolution 
and supporting Arab Shīʿites, who are the majority in Bahrain and Iraq and a significant 
minority in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, against persecution.153 
Surūr sought to provide an especially urgent warning to those of his fellow Sunni 
Islamists who might gravitate towards the revolutionary ideas of Khomeini as to what he 
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perceived as the true intentions of the Shīʿites’ plans.154 He also seeks to degrade 
Khomeini’s prestige and his revolution among Sunnis, portraying the Ayatollah’s pan-
Islamic promises as publicity stunts belied by the cooperation of the Islamic revolution’s 
leaders with the Americans, Israelis, and the Syrian regime. He describes Khomeini as “a 
Shīʿite leader bigoted for his sect” who “calls [only] for a Shīʿite Islamic state and does 
not mention the question of cooperation with the Sunnis or merger with them.”155 
Furthermore, he argues that Khomeini believes that Islamic unity can be achieved only 
through conversion of Sunnis to Shīʿism and their acceptance of the ʿiṣmah of Imāms. He 
adds that in his book Islamic Government, Khomeini excludes the first three Rightly 
Guided Caliphs as a model of the Islamic government, and this means not recognizing 
them. 156 In his writings, Khomeini also detracts from the standing of the companion 
Muʿāwiyah ibn Abī Sufyān.157 
In addition, the book goes even further to undermine the appeal of the Revolution, 
describing Khomeini as an agent of the United States and Europe and depicting the 
Iranian Revolution as an American product. Surūr argues that although Khomeini 
continuously criticized the United States for Iran’s economic problems and supporting 
the authoritarian regime of the Shah, he did not shut down the US embassy as he did the 
Israeli Embassy after the revolution. He adds that Iranian oil exports continued to the 
United States and the West as usual, and the revolution’s leaders did not even mind 
exporting oil to Israel.158 Furthermore, Surūr argues that Khomeini set the theological 
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basis that gave permission for collusion with the enemies. He notes that Khomeini issued 
a fatwa that allowed providing aid for enemies, citing the actions of Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī, 
one of great Twelver Shīʿī scholar, who “put himself in the service of the Tatars 
invaders” and aided the Mongol forces under Hulegu when he attacked Baghdad in 
1258.159 As proof of Khomeini’s treason with the United States, Surūr details several 
contacts and meetings between Khomeini himself and officials from the American 
administration when he was in France.160 Surūr assumes that the US administration of 
President Jimmy Carter orchestrated the Iranian Revolution, supporting his claim by 
citing the memoirs of the Shah, Khomeini’s partners in the revolution and media 
reports.161 
Surūr was also one of the earliest Sunni writers who noticed the contention 
between Khomeini and anti-Khomeini groups within Iran in the post-Revolutionary 
period. He uncovers the clash between Ayatollah Khomeini and Ayatollah Muhammad 
Kazem Shariatmadari, who was at odds with Khomeini regarding several matters such as 
interpretation of the concept of the “Guardianship of the Jurists” (wilāyat al-faqīh), the 
constitution, the system of government, and the occupation of the US embassy in 
Tehran.162 However, followers of the Shariatmadari were suppressed, and Shariatmadari 
himself was put under house arrest.163 Surūr repeats his warning for Sunni Islamists who 
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sympathized with Khomeini, noting that he crushed his partners in the revolution and 
even his fellow Shīʿites.164 
Furthermore, Surūr tries to attack the pan-Islamic nature of Khomeini's vision by 
questioning his solidarity with the Palestinian cause. He compares Khomeini’s speeches 
and slogans with those of Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser, who had captured the 
imagination of the Palestinians and Arabs in the 1950s and 1960s. According to Surūr, 
Khomeini would let them down, as Abdel Nasser did.165 He also criticizes Yasser 
Arafat’s welcoming position of Khomeini, reminding the Palestine Liberation 
Organization how the “Syrian Nuṣayrī regime” had intervened in favor of the Maronites 
against the Palestinians and Lebanese Muslims, siding mainly with Lebanese Shīʿa 
represented by Shaykh Musa al-Sadr and Amal movement to the Syrian army.166 Surūr 
also cites several statements by Iranian officials apologizing for their inability to provide 
aid to the Palestinian liberation movement, with the excuse that Iran was now in critical 
conditions.167 He insists that Khomeini will not fight Israel and that all his promises and 
professed solidarity with the Palestinian cause only amounted to a ploy to gain popularity 
among Sunnis. Another reason for Surūr’s criticism was the continuous purchase of 
Israeli weapons by Tehran.168 Surūr argues that “the rulers of Tehran are more dangerous 
to Islam than Jews... They will cooperate with the Jews in fighting the Muslims.”169 He 
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adds that “those who are plotting against Iraq, the Gulf, Lebanon, and Syria will not fight 
Israel.”170 
All of these charges thus led Surūr to conclusion that Arab Shīʿites comprise a 
“fifth column” for Iran and act as its tool to destabilize the region.171 During the Iranian 
Revolution and after the return of Khomeini to Tehran in 1979, Shīʿites started 
demonstrations in Iraq, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia.172 Surūr talks about a plan to sweep 
through the Gulf organized by Iranians and led by local Shīʿites who were originally 
Persian.173 These movements were accompanied by smuggling and the distribution of 
weapons among Shīʿites to cause disturbance in the Gulf.174 Surūr contends that many 
Gulf Shīʿites today are originally Persian, and they only managed to buy their citizenship 
in the 1950s when the Gulf states were still poor. Although they became citizens of these 
states, their language, culture, and behavior remained irreducibly Persian. Surūr writes 
that the Gulf Shīʿites “live with their bodies in the Gulf, but their hearts and minds live in 
Tehran.”175 
Surūr also articulates skepticism about the alliance between the secular Baʿathist 
Syrian regime and the Iranian regime which claimed to speak on behalf of Islam. After 
taking power in 1970, Hafiz al-Assad, an ʿAlawīte, relied on his family and sect in ruling 
Syria, which led to revived discussion about the heretical character of the ʿAlawīs among 
regime’s opponents. Hafiz al-Assad sought to obtain recognition from Musa al-Sadr, the 
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Iranian-born Shīʿite cleric and founder of the Amal movement in Lebanon, who issued a 
fatwa recognizing the ʿAlawīs as Shīʿī Muslims.176 The Islamic Revolution gave Islamists 
in Syria an example of how an Islamist movement was able to overthrow one of the most 
authoritarian regimes in the region. The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood intensified their 
opposition, and elements of it engaged in an armed conflict against the Syrian regime. So 
the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, who welcomed the Islamic revolution in Iran, might 
seem to offer a natural ally for the new Islamic regime that promoted Muslim solidarity 
as a cornerstone of its foreign policy. Instead of supporting the Syrian Muslim 
Brotherhood, however, the revolutionary regime developed special relations with the 
secular Syrian state and denounced the Islamic opposition. Surūr asks how Khomeini’s 
followers criticized all regimes in the region except the Syrian government. He attributes 
this betrayal to the confessional closeness between the Shīʿites of Iran and the Nuṣayrī 
(ʿAlawī) regime of Syria.177 Another reason for their alliance was that the Syrian regime 
provided support for the Shīʿites of Lebanon and sought to help them achieve their 
aspirations, contrary to any professed sense.178 Surūr affirms that like the new Iranian 
regime, the Syrian regime is “majūsi” and “rāfiḍi.”179 We can see here a political reason 
for Surūr’s criticism of Khomeini and the Shīʿites.  
Moreover, Surūr objects to the idea that only an Iranian can be the Supreme 
Leader of the Shīʿites in the world. He declares that such a principle is not Islamic but a 
majūsi practice, because Islam does not recognize national boundaries and 
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nationalities.180 Surūr criticizes some fundamental principles in the 1979 Constitution 
such as the stipulation that the President should be Iranian.181 Surūr also accuses 
Khomeini of “setting up slaughterhouses” in every town and village in Iran and punishing 
the opposition severely.182 Furthermore, as a result of the purge against the Shah’s 
supporters and the opposition, Iran suffered from “brain drain.” The scientists, doctors, 
dentists, and professors left Iran fearing torture and other abuses.183 He also discusses the 
situation of Sunnis in Iran after the revolution, who suffered from persecution, 
discrimination, and poverty as a result of marginalization and did not have access to 
higher political positions.184 He condemns celebration of Nowruz (the Iranian New Year) 
after the Islamic revolution in Iran, characterizing it as “a jahili majūsi holiday.” Before 
the revolution, the followers of Khomeini “used to attack the Shah because he sought to 
revive Persian majūsi habits and traditions which Islam annulled,” yet, the celebration of 
Nowruz continued after the Islamic Revolution. Surūr asked how Khomeini forgot the 
teachings of Islam and gave a speech on this occasion.185  
Surūr attacked the Iranian revolution in the early 1980s, trying to assess the 
effects and impacts of it on political and religious groups across the Arab Muslim world. 
He tried to explore the imminent danger of the Iranian revolution as a harbinger Shīʿīte 
expansion in Iraq and the Gulf. The Salafī and Wahhābī influence of Surūr’s anti-Shīʿa 
thoughts is present in the book in its criticisms of Shīʿī doctrines and practice. However, 
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he developed his own type of anti-Shīʿism grounded in ethnic and political antagonism, 
illustrated for the most part by many historical examples of alleged betrayal of the rāfiḍh 
against Islam and Islamic umma. Surūr counted a long list of what he called the 
conspiracies of Shīʿī sects against Islam and aiding the enemies of the umma. In addition 
to this book, Surūr penned other works like Amal and the Palestinian Camps and The 
Condition of the Sunnis in Iran in his effort to unveil the danger of Khomeini’s ideology.  
Surūr stated that his book and its anti-Khomeini views struck a dissenting note at 
the very apex of Khomeini’s widespread appeal among Islamists. However, the book 
surged in influence from the 1980s, continuing to 2000s. With the increasing Sunni-Shīʿī 
tensions in recent decades, Surūr’s anti-Shīʿa thoughts have since commanded an even 
wider audience. Some argue that Surūr’s views on Shīʿism and Iran became a reservoir 
for several Salafi-jihadi ideologues and thinkers, laying the groundwork for intensified 
the sectarian extremism in many parts of the Middle East like Iraq, Syria, and Yemen.186 
Nibras Kazimi for example, demonstrated the tremendous impact of Surūr’s book on the 
treatise and speeches of the jihādīs. Kazimi argues that the book was the main influence 
on Abū Muṣʿab al-Zarqāwī, the leader of al-Qāʿida in Iraq, who declared jihād against 
the Shīʿites majority in Iraq.187 
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For others, years after the Iranian Revolution, Surūr’s prophecy of Iranian Shīʿī 
aspirations in the Arab world has become evident. Consequently, Surūr received 
admiration and recognition as a writer who faced and forecasted Iranian plans to expand 
in the region. Additionally, almost all the obituaries and eulogies for him on his website 
from high profile Islamic individuals and Islamic organizations lauded his role in 
unmasking the danger of Iranian “majūs” “rāfiḍa” and warning the “umma.” Finally, the 
ultimate goal of the book is to persuade his fellow Islamists to not be deceived by 
Khomeini’s thoughts. Thus, Surūr’s writings played a significant role in modernizing and 
popularizing anti-Shiism by reawakening dormant confessional debates and adding ethnic 
and political perspectives. 
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Chapter 4 
Debates with Saudi Salafīs 
In the late 1970s, as Surūr established himself in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia faced two 
severe challenges to its Islamic legitimacy and its security: the Iranian Revolution and the 
occupation of the Grand Mosque in Mecca. The previous chapter explored Surūr’s 
reaction to the Iranian Revolution and his anti-Shiʿi writings. The Saudi royal family, too, 
reacted to these challenges by leaning more heavily on their Islamic credentials, adopting 
stricter religious norms and supporting various Islamic causes. With Surūr out of the 
country, his followers in Saudi Arabia maintained a relatively non-oppositional 
relationship with the Saudi state for at least a decade and generated relatively scant 
controversy. As mentioned before, they even distributed Surūr’s anti-Shi’i treatise once 
he was safely exiled from the country. 
However, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 transformed these dynamics, 
contributing to a notable deterioration in the relationship between the Saudi authorities 
and the Ṣaḥwīs (the awakened; the people of Ṣaḥwa) over the intervention of foreign 
troops in the Gulf War in the 1990s. The growing stridency and opposition of the Ṣaḥwīs 
to the hosting of US military personnel on Saudi soil, however, did not merely lead to 
government repression. As we shall see in this chapter, a backlash against Ṣaḥwī 
stridency also led to the emergence a new Salafī group—the pro-regime and quietist 
Jāmīs—as a reaction against the Ṣaḥwa, particularly its political tendencies, and its 
oppositional activities to the Saudi government. Specifically, the Gulf crisis and the first 
protests against the Saudi government in the 1990s reignited longstanding debates about 
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the theological validity of Salafīs participating in politics. The debate between Surūr and 
Ṣaḥwīs on the one hand, who advocated non-violent political activism, and the Jāmīs—or 
as Surūr called them “ḥizb al-wulāt”—who adopted a quietist posture, sheds light on the 
evolving discussion among Salafīs about the legitimacy of political engagement. 
The chapter offers an understanding of Salafism that moves beyond the 
stereotypes of radicalism, terror, and violence that permeates much of the academic 
discussion about political Islam and religiosity in Saudi Arabia.188 Analyzing debates 
among the non-violent Salafi strands in Saudi Arabia on different issues reveals the 
diversity of views on matters ranging from religious reformism and politics to relations 
between Muslim believers and their rulers. Although both Ṣaḥwīs and Jāmīs adhere to the 
same overarching current of modern Salafism, with shared belief in returning to the 
model of the Prophet and al-salaf al-saliḥ, fighting bidʿ (a plural of bidʿa; innovations) 
and rejecting taqlīd, they nevertheless engaged in heated debates regarding the stances of 
the Ṣaḥwīs on religious reform, the restoration of the importance of Sharīʿa in the 
Kingdom, and a possible confrontation with potential secular influences in the Kingdom.  
The most significant areas of conflict between the Ṣaḥwīs and their counterparts 
were fiqh al-waqiʿ (jurisprudence of reality) and tawḥīd al-ḥākimiyya (the Oneness of 
God’s governance/sovereignty). In the late 1980s and beginnings of the 1990s, the 
Ṣaḥwīs appeared as the only practitioners of the fiqh al-waqiʿ, which is an old concept 
that was revived by Sururis and used as a tool for religious reform and enhancing their 
momentum over other groups. It requires Muslim scholars to acquire secular knowledge 
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in addition to religious knowledge in order to reformulate an accurate ruling or fatwa and 
gain a good view of the world. However, Jāmīs saw the concept as a threat aimed at 
destabilizing the authority of Sharīʿa and the prestige of traditional Wahhabi ʿulamāʾ. 
During the same period, the Ṣaḥwīs began to propagate the concept of ṭawḥīd al-
ḥākimiyya, which provided them the theological justification for their claim that the 
Saudi government was insufficiently Islamic, a claim which elicited the opposition of 
Jāmīs who saw the concept as a theologically unacceptable bidʿa (innovation). 
To elucidate this sharp polarization between the Ṣaḥwīs and Jāmīs, this chapter 
will explore writings from both sides of this Salafi divide. On the Jāmī side, the opinion 
of Dr. Rabīʿ b. Hādī al-Madkhalī, author of dozens of books and lectures, will provide 
insight into the fierce denunciations and methodological refutations aimed against the 
Ṣaḥwīs during the 1990s. On the opposite side, we will examine the Ṣaḥwīs’ responses to 
Jāmī’s criticism by reviewing the writing of their chief protagonist, the exiled religious 
leader, Shaykh Muḥammad Surūr, who after 1984 found refuge in the United Kingdom. 
Even in absentia, Surūr wrote a series of widely read articles in his magazine al-Sunnah 
defending the Ṣaḥwīs what he referred to as the “free centrist Salafīs.” He also criticized 
those Salafis who provided unconditional support to the government in its conflict against 
the Ṣaḥwi, labelling this with them with the epithet “ḥizb al-wulāt (loyalist party.) 
The magazine al-Sunnah provided Surūr with soft power, allowing him to gain 
more followers and attack opponents. It was concerned with political affairs in the 
Islamic world more than religious studies and formulated political events from Surūr’s 
Islamic point of view. Al-Sunnah is known for criticizing Arab governments, and thus it 
was banned in most Arab countries. Despite the ban, the magazine was smuggled, 
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reprinted, and distributed by the Ṣaḥwīs, some of whom wrote in Al-Sunnah under 
pseudonyms.189 During the Gulf crisis, Al-Sunnah gained wide popularity among the 
Ṣaḥwīs when the magazine increased its opposition to the Saudi regime. Al-Sunna 
Magazine’s denunciations of the Saudi regime culminated in an article by Shaykh 
Muḥammad Surūr entitled “Al-Irāhb Al-Saʿūdi” (Saudi Terrorism) in 1994, condemning 
the campaign of arrests against key figures in the Saḥwa, like Shaykh Salmān al-ʿAwda, 
and Shaykh Safar al-Ḥawālī.190 Shaykh Ṣaliḥ al-Fawzān, member of the Committee of 
Senior Ulama and sworn enemy of the Ṣaḥwa, declared Al-Sunnah more dangerous to the 
umma than drugs because its content undermines the unity of the Muslim umma and 
instigates fitna. He warned the Muslims not to be deceived by the name of the 
magazine.191 
Challenges to the Saudi State in the 1980s 
To understand the polarizing debates between Ṣaḥwīs and Jāmīs in the 1990s, one 
first needs to understand the broader historical backdrop of challenges confronting the 
Saudi state. First, the Islamic Revolution in Iran of 1979 constituted a serious challenge 
to Saudi Arabia’s effort to gain primacy in the Muslim world. As discussed in chapter 3, 
the new Iranian leaders claimed to represent Islam and wanted to export the Islamic 
revolution to other Muslim countries including Saudi Arabia. Such revolutionary stances 
proved profoundly threatening to the Saudi regime, which had long claimed a position as 
the only genuinely Islamic state and true representative of the global Islamic 
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community.192 Yet, at the same time, the Saudis also confronted a challenge not only 
from the Shīʿite revolution in Iran, but also from militant Salafis like al-Jamaʿa al-
Salafiyya al-Muḥtasiba, a violent group led by Juhaymān Al-ʿUtaybī that seized the 
Grand Mosque in Mecca in November 1979. Al-ʿUtaybī specifically condemned the 
Saudi royal family for its corruption and alliance with the Christian states of the West. In 
addition, he attacked the Wahhābī ʿulamāʾ for bolstering the rulers and failing to 
condemn its policies that went against Islam. Through seizing the Meccan Grand 
Mosque, Al-ʿUtaybī was asserting that the royal family was unfit to serve as custodians 
of the holy cities of Islam.193  
Under the pressure of these events from multiple directions, Saudi Arabia’s 
leaders felt compelled to yield to the increased demands of the Wahhābī ʿulamāʾ in 
exchange for their continued political quiescence. Specifically, the regime abandoned its 
effort to cultivate an image of Islamic modernizers and instead did the bidding of 
Wahhābī establishment by helping to enforce an austere public interpretation of public 
dress and comportment. The government conferred more power upon the Committee for 
the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice, for example, by allowing them to 
enforce a strict observance of Wahhābī principles in public places, such as enforcing the 
closure of businesses during prayer time.194 In its effort to enhance the religious 
credibility of his regime, King Fahd also contributed to the jihād in Afghanistan after the 
Soviet invasion in 1979 and adopted the title of Custodian of the Two Holy Cities 
(Khādim al-Ḥaramayn al-Sharīfayn) in 1986. Through such actions, the Saudi monarchy 
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hoped to outmaneuver challengers by responding to Iranian revolutionary rhetoric abroad 
and bolstering its image as the defender of Islam at home.195  
In this precarious political moment, however, the Saudi state did not seek to 
undermine all politicized Salafi; to the contrary, they sought to isolate the groups 
responsible for occupying the Grand Mosque in Mecca by increasing their support for 
other religious groups with sway. Indeed, outside the Wahhabi establishment, much of 
the Saudi government aid went to groups associated with the Ṣaḥwa movement, including 
the Surūrīs. The Saudi authorities initially sought to enhance the influence of the Ṣaḥwa 
by providing more support to their activities such as summer camps and Islamic scouts.196 
Indeed, why try to undermine a group and its spiritual leader, Surūr, who were so 
vociferously opposed to one of the Saudi state’s main antagonists, the Islamic Republic 
of Iran. Furthermore, they allowed the Islamist groups to operate freely with little 
oversight. The Surūrīs and other Ṣaḥwīs took advantage of the relative freedom to 
develop their networks. By the 1990s, they had gained momentum and dominated the 
political and social life in the kingdom as an estimable rival to the Wahhabi elite.197 
However, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 brought the relationship 
between the Saudi government and the Ṣaḥwīs to a crashing halt. The Saudi royal family, 
concerned about Saddam Hussein’s ambition to continue his invasion all the way into the 
Kingdom, invited Western troops onto its territory as a necessary measure to protect the 
country from aggression. To justify this move, the Saudi rulers sought a fatwa from the 
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Wahhābī establishment of officially employed ʿulamāʾ to authorize permission for non-
Muslim troops in Saudi Arabia to fight against other Muslims. The Council of Senior 
ʿulamāʾ, headed by Mufti ibn Bāz, who commanded great prestige among all Saudi 
religious circle, issued a fatwa permitting the rulers’ efforts.198 This fateful decision 
incited considerable backlash against the Kingdom for many years, especially among 
radical groups like al-Qāʿida, who used the presence of US troops as justification for the 
9/11 attacks. However, a much wider and non-violent strata of politically-engaged Salafis 
also fiercely opposed this invitation to American troops, particularly the Ṣaḥwīs and 
various other upstart popular preachers. All these groups criticized the fatwa for allowing 
the intrusion of non-Muslim forces into the Kingdom to protect the holiest places, 
believing that the Western military intervention would increase foreign, non-Muslim 
domination. Although the Ṣaḥwīs had condemned the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and 
potential march into Saudi Arabia, at the same time, they also condemned the Saudi 
decision to call American troops for help against Saddam Hussein.  
Criticism of the introduction of US troops into Saudi Arabia catalyzed a wide-
ranging Islamist oppositional movement against the authority of the Saudi royal family 
and Wahhābī establishment. This movement soon brought two young influential religious 
figures, who are often referred to as Surūrīs, Shaykhs Safar al-Ḥawālī and Salmān al-
ʿAwda, to the fore as new leaders. Soon known as Shuyukh al-Ṣaḥwa (Shaykhs of the 
awakening), these two figures helped spearhead the movement by expressing their 
objections through Friday sermons, pronouncements, letters, and petitions. Two young 
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influential Shaykhs emerged as the leaders of the Islamist opposition movement within 
Saud Arabia.199 
These two young leaders, in turn, spearheaded the Letter of Demands and the 
Memorandum of Advice, which crystallized mounting protests and attracted the 
signatures of hundreds of Ṣaḥwa figures before their final submission to the king and 
mufti Shaykh ibn Bāz in 1991 and 1992. These petitions demanded the implementation of 
comprehensive reforms to Saudi state apparatuses, including modification of the political 
system within the boundaries of sharīʿa.200  
While this movement briefly flourished after the arrival of US troops in 1990, 
mobilizing a large number of young people, as we shall see, it quickly lost its momentum. 
The Saudi government responded by taking a firmer stand against the Ṣaḥwīs and 
suppressing the shaykhs of Ṣaḥwa. In 1994, the government started to arrest the most 
important figures, including shaykhs Salman al-ʿAwda and Safar al-Ḥawālī. Even more 
damaging, however, this brief resurgence of an independent, politically-minded, but also 
non-violent Salafism in the form of an energized Ṣaḥwa movement also soon engendered 
a deep backlash not just with state officials, but also across the spectrum of devout 
Muslims. In particular, a new movement known as the Jāmīs, a separate group from the 
Wahhābī establishment that preached devotion to the Saudi state, rather than protest, 
would arise. 
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The Counter Ideology (Jāmī Movement) 
On the eve of the Gulf War, the Jāmī movement emerged as a potent 
countervailing force, loosely subscribing to the overarching framework of Salafī Islamic 
beliefs yet reacting against other Salafis like the Ṣaḥwa movement who engaged in 
opposition to the Saudi government and the traditional Wahhābī ʿulamāʾ. In particular, 
the Jāmī developed a reputation for their severe criticism of the Ṣaḥwa and any other 
Islamist movements that dared mount political opposition against the religious legitimacy 
of the Saudi regime while providing support of the Saudi regime’s policies and acts. This 
position emanates from the principle of listening and obedience to walī al-amr (the ruler). 
Ultimately, this new movement leveled criticism not just against their immediate 
antagonists among the Sahwa movement, including Safar al-Ḥawālī and Salmān al-
ʿAwda, but also a broader pantheon of famous intellectual luminaries of political 
Islamism, including renowned figures such as Mawdudi and Sayyid Qutḅ.  
The “Jāmī” specifically derives from the name of an important cleric, Shaykh 
Muḥammad Amān al-Jāmī who was born in Ethiopia in 1930 and later emigrated to 
Saudi Arabia. He chaired the Faculty of Ḥadīth at the Islamic University of Medina until 
his death in 1995.201 As with the Surūris, the members of this backlash movement did not 
explicitly choose or embrace the term “Jāmīs,” but instead had it foisted upon them by 
their antagonists.202 For many Ṣaḥwīs, labelling their antagonists as “Jāmī” had the effect 
 
201 http://dusunnah.com/article/1045/.  
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of undermining their legitimacy by associating them with a “foreign” Ethiopian Shaykh. 
The group is also referred to as “Scholastic Salafis” (al-Salafiyyah al-ʿIlmiyyah.).203  
However, despite such efforts to tarnish the group as foreign, the most well-
known Jāmī figure is Rabīʿ b. Hādī al-Madkhalī, born in 1931 in the Jizan Province of 
southern Saudi Arabia. He began to study at his village schools when he was eight years 
and later continued his education at the Al-Maʿhad al-ʿIlmī (Scientific Institution) in 
Saamitah. In 1960, he joined the Faculty of Sharīʿa in Riyadh before moving in 1961 to 
the Islamic University of Medina, where he studied under ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz b. Bāz (1909–
1999), Muḥammad Nāsịr al-Dīn al-Albānī (1914–1999), and Muḥammad Amīn al-
Shanqītī.̣204 Al-Madkhalī specialized in the field of ḥadīth, particularly al-jarḥ wa-l-taʿdīl 
(disparagement and praise), which is a method to evaluate narrators of ḥadīth. However, 
during the internal polarization of the 1990s, al-Madkhalī deployed this religious 
knowledge as a tool to criticize his political adversaries.205 
Al-Madkhalī held a particular literalist interpretation of Islamic sources that 
distinguished him even among Salafis. He was especially attracted to the teachings of 
shaykh Muḥammad Nāsịr al-Dīn al-Albānī, whom the International Crisis Group noted in 
a 2004 report “had founded a school of Islamic thought that views the Ḥadīth as the sole 
basis for religious decisions” and “rejected all schools of Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh), 
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including Wahhābīsm, insofar as they involved a degree of human judgment.”206 This 
school of devotion to a literalist interpretation is often referred to as “Ahl al-Ḥadīth” in 
reference to the medieval school that emerged in the 8th and 9th century. Devotees of the 
Ahl al-Ḥadīth focus on purifying the faith from bidʿ (pl. of bidaʿa innovations) and 
teaching Muslims about their religion, but also issuing condemnations of those who 
pursue political participation.207 In order to spread their views, the Jāmīs used the same 
methods utilized by Ṣaḥwīs, such as cassette tapes, websites, pamphlets, books, and 
conferences.208 Asserting that all Arab political regimes are legitimate, the Jāmīs thus 
argue that it is a religious obligation for Muslims to offer unconditional obedience to the 
walī al-amr (the ruler). The only political action they deem acceptable is the provision of 
secret and private advice for the rulers behind palace walls.  
Linked to this notion of the listening and obedience, the Jāmīs also advocated for 
quietism in part because they regard politics and political machinations as the main 
sources of fitna (internal strife) that afflicted the Muslim community across history. Thus, 
this group labelled anyone who opposed the Saudi regime as a Khārigī (Kharijite, one 
that departs), a Muslim secessionist sect that appeared after the battle of Ṣiffīn between 
ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib, the fourth caliph, and Muʿāwiyah ibn Abī Sufyān, governor of Syria, 
in 657, and a term in the contemporary lexicon that denigrates those who oppose a 
legitimate Islamic rule.209 Not surprisingly, experts like Meijer, have argued that the 
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Jāmīs gained most of their religious authority from the tazkiyat (recommendations) of 
those leading Wahhabi and Salafi scholars at the apex of the religious pyramid, such as 
Shaykhs Ibn Bāz and al-Albānī.210 Therefore, the Jāmīs insisted that they did not 
comprise a political party or group, but instead encouraged their followers to remain 
strictly apolitical in their daily affairs.  
The Jāmīs developed theological refutations aimed at famous international 
Islamist figures such as al-Banna and Qutḅ as well as their followers among wider 
Islamist groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood and al-Tablīgh. These theological 
refutations often devolved into slander and vilification of those groups that did not share 
the Jāmī’s approaches to Salafism. This vociferous criticism started with an attack against 
the Muslim Brotherhood, who they saw as the main source of mixing Islam with politics 
and which of course had been an early inspiration for figures like Surūr. Al-Madkhalī 
claimed that “The Muslim Brotherhood is more harmful to Islam than the real kuffar 
(unbelievers) because the Muslims are not deceived by kuffar, but they are deceived by 
those misleading innovators who lead people going astray.”211 Shaykh Rabīʿ b. Hādī al-
Madkhalī also warned in his writings about the danger of the Muslim Brotherhood and 
other Islamist groups infiltrating Saudi Arabia. Al-Madkhalī blamed the Muslim 
Brotherhood for seeking to “distort the Salafī methodology,” effect the “extinction [of] 
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the light of tawḥīd,” and obtain the “replacement with their rotten methodologies (such 
as) methodology of the Ikhwān and Qutḅīs.”212  
The Jāmī critique extended to include the most prominent thinkers behind the 
Muslim Brotherhood such as Sayyid Qutḅ. Al-Madkhalī declared that “the heads of 
contemporary ahl al-bidʿ” (the people who commit blameworthy innovations) and “the 
heads of ahl al-fitan” (the people who cause and instigate strife) are Sayyid Qutḅ, 
(Ḥasan) al-Bannā, Mawdudi, and Ḥasan Turābī.213 Al-Madkhalī wrote four books against 
Qutḅ and his ideas, refuting the core precepts of his thoughts such as the idea of 
jahiliyyah. Furthermore, he accused Qutḅ of practicing takfīr (excommunication) of the 
Islamic communities, calling for socialism, rejecting the attributes of Allāh, and believing 
in the creation of the Qurʾān, which is a doctrine coined by the Muʿtazila (Mutazilites) 
who believed that the Qurʾān is created by God and was not eternal, uncreated, and the 
words of God as most mainstream Muslims of the day believed. He also accused Qutḅ of 
propagating the blasphemous principle of waḥdat al-wujūd (Unity of Being), which is 
one of the major ideas of Ṣūfism.214 While al-Madkhalī did not pronounce takfīr against 
Qutḅ explicitly, the observer can see in these condemnations of Qutḅ an implicit takfīr. 
According to the Salafi view, whoever believes in the creation of Qurʾān or waḥdat al-
wujūd commits kufr (apostasy) and will be out of Islam. 
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Surūr’s Counterattack and Defending the Muslim Brotherhood and Qutḅ 
At the time of the fierce Jāmī backlash against the Sahwa, Surūr had not 
disappeared from the intellectual or theological scene, despite his physical absence from 
Saudi Arabia. In 1984, Surūr moved to the United Kingdom as an investor in publishing 
and distribution coming from Kuwait. In Birmingham, he established the publishing 
house “Dar al-Araqam” and the “Center for Islamic Studies.” In 1989, he also founded 
the al-Sunnah magazine, which became a platform to express his views and attitudes 
towards political issues and events.215 From his new exile, Surūr was one of the earliest 
figures to comment upon the origins and rise of this new Jāmī movement, as well as to 
advance a full-fledged rebuttal of its theological approach. By the mid-1990s, Surūr 
churned out several extensive criticisms and observed that Jāmī rhetoric consisted of two 
main pillars: first, unconditional support for the royal family, and second, a campaign of 
vilification against political Islamists such as al-Bannā, Qutḅ, the Muslim Brotherhood 
and al-Tablīgh. Surūr responded to this criticism with inflammatory accusations of his 
own, criticizing the Jāmīs for manipulating and betraying the true Salafī creed, as well as 
performing espionage for the Saudi regime. 
In his writings, Surūr called the Jāmīs ḥizb al-wūlāt or “party of the loyalists,” 
mocking their exhortation to full obedience and complete submission to wūlāt al-amer 
(the ruler). Surūr admitted that the loyalists agree with other Salafīs about foundational 
theological creeds, but they disagree with them about their advocacy for unconditional 
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loyalty toward the rulers, claiming that in so doing, the Jāmīs even violate Islamic law.216 
Surūr observed that the loyalists tried to tar all criticism with the brush of unlawful 
“innovation” and also accused all those who disagreed with them of being “Qutḅists,” 
“Surūris,” and “Ikhwān.”217  
Beyond their devotion to the Saudi state and what he perceived as their flawed 
interpretation of Islamic doctrine, Surūr embraced a more specifically geostrategic 
argument, contending that the Jāmī provided a useful tool for American aims in the 
region. For instance, he noted that the Jāmī movement only emerged after the Gulf War 
and the rise of the United States as the ruler over a “New World Order” directed at 
subjecting the Middle East to its control. According to Surūr, the United States 
understood that the only groups that could really thwart their aims of hegemony in the 
Middle East were politically engaged Islamists and Salafists. Therefore, it made sense 
that the US would seek to defuse such threats and mobilize public opinion by impugning 
Salafīs as fundamentalist terrorists. However, Surūr also believes that the United States 
sought to weaken Islamist politics by sowing internal dissension and weakening any 
Salafi organization that maintained autonomy from their ally, the Saudi State. The Jāmī, 
in particular, contrary to their outward appearances of scriptural literalism, in fact, served 
American agendas by undermining the forces of political Salafism and thus helping “to 
lay the roots of secularism and remain loyal to the enemies of Islam.” 218  
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Surūr also drew attention to what he perceived as the contradiction between Jāmī 
rhetoric and their actual practices. Specifically, he argued that the Jāmī stance of rejecting 
politics concealed the reality that they themselves embraced the tools of a modern 
political party.  For example, even though the Jāmī loyalists denounced politics and the 
political parties as the source of blameworthy “innovation” (bidʿa), they nonetheless 
embraced the structure of a political party “with popular base, leadership, methodology, 
and goals.”219 More recently, academic researchers have also drawn attention to this gap 
between a professed opposition to politics and the reality of political mobilization. Khālid 
Mushawaḥ, an expert in Islamist movements, argued that the Jāmī group began to assume 
a ḥarakī character, with a large number of its followers organized around and receiving 
orders from a centralized leadership–the very attributes to which they supposedly 
expressed unyielding opposition.220 Meijer also recognizes this paradox. He argues that 
“[f]or although it pretends to be apolitical or even anti-political and is against internal 
strife (fitna) within the umma, which supposedly results from politics and machinations, 
the movement itself uses instruments of power to obtain hegemony in the transnational 
Islamic movement and ultimately becomes itself a political movement, provoking 
resistance and ultimately fostering internal strife.”221 Intentionally or unintentionally, the 
Jamis engaged in precisely the same activities for which they criticized other Salafis. 
They committed the same actions that they warned against, practicing politics and 
promoting division within the Muslim communities. 
 
219 Ibid., 86. 
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Surūr thus made the argument that the main feature of the loyalists is not their 
detachment from politics, but rather, their hostility to specific political Islamist 
movements, especially the Muslim Brotherhood. Although Surūr acknowledged that 
there are flaws and shortcomings in the Muslim Brotherhood’s methodology, as 
discussed in chapter two, he does not find justification for Jāmī loyalists to engage in 
such ad hominem attacks against them, noting the organization still belongs to the Ahl al-
Sunah wa al-Jamaʿa (the Sunnis; lit. people of the tradition of the Prophet and 
community).222 
Surūr thus devoted a portion of his condemnation of the Jāmīs to specifically 
refuting their attacks against Sayyid Qutḅ. Surūr admitted that he admired Qutb for his 
steadiness/inalterableness on the truth, boldness in facing the ṭāghūt (despot, idol), and 
knowledge. Surūr denied that Qutḅ was Ṣūfī, muʿtazla, Ashʿari, an advocate of the 
concept of wahdt al-wujud, or an extremist. At the time, Surūr admitted that Qutḅ had 
made mistakes in some religious issues, which is normal and not necessarily meriting 
extreme condemnation according to Surūr, because Qutḅ is only human and does not 
have ʿiṣma (infallibility) like prophets.223  
Throughout his writings, Surūr evokes a sense of surprise at the Jāmī campaign 
against various political Islamists, particularly their equation of the culprit (the ruler) with 
the victim (the Islamists), and questioned how they support the ruler against the Islamists. 
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Surūr further amplified his criticism by likening the position of the Jāmīs with that of 
secularists, particularly in terms of their complete alignment with the views of the Saudi 
government on which groups they support and which groups they oppose.224 Most 
damningly, Surūr charged that Jāmī loyalists invoke the Salafī call but strip it of all its 
spirit and betray its meaning.225  
Surūr argued that the efforts of the Jāmī loyalists are directed mainly to 
monopolizing the Islamic arenas, believing that “they are responsible for the Salafi call” 
so they can include whoever they like and exclude whoever they dislike.226 They put 
themselves in charge to combat the deviations of the Islamists, using the principle of al-
jarḥ wa-l-taʿdīl (disparagement and praise). Surūr argued that condemnation of 
innovations was done through exaggeration of mistakes of the duʿāt (preachers) and 
Islamist groups. They began a campaign against the antagonists from the Islamists, 
looking for mistakes or religious errors in their writings and lectures. Once they see a 
mistake done by an Islamist, they call him mubtadʿ (a person of innovation). Then, they 
wage public smear campaigns against this antagonist.227 Furthermore, Surūr accused the 
loyalists of espionage for the Saudi royal family, claiming that their writings, audiotapes, 
and lectures became reports against their rivals such as Surūris and other Ṣaḥwīs to the 
intelligence services. Surūr mentioned that the Jāmī loyalists wrote a long report 
submitted to the Saudi Interior Minister under the title “the International Secret 
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Organization between Planning and Implementation in Saudi Arabia” in the middle of the 
1990s. The report recommended state authorities take measures against their Ṣaḥwī 
opponents because they pose a danger to the Kingdom. Surūr stated that this report 
contained a lot of lies and fallacies against the Islamists in Saudi Arabia.228 Furthermore, 
Surūr described “the loyalists” with ahl al-ahwāʾ (the people of desire) because they are 
driven by their whims and passions.229  
Surūr’s Anti-Jamī Campaign: Condemning the Wrong and Rejecting Total 
Obedience 
In response to this vehement criticism, the Jāmīs excoriated Surūr himself for 
abandoning Saudi Arabia to live in the West, for his lack of ʿilm (knowledge), for not 
respecting ʿulamāʾ and for criticizing the rulers. The Jāmīs, who called for complete 
obedience for the rulers in everything, accused Surūr of “intellectual terrorism” because 
he described the ʿulamāʾ as slaves at the service of the ruler for their fatwa permitting the 
aid of non-Muslim troops in the Gulf War.230 The Jāmīs believed that the political 
authority in the Kingdom should make the decision on the behalf the nation. Opposing 
the Saudi monarchy and rebellion against it constitutes forbidden acts.231 On the contrary, 
they believe that Surūr, as well as everyone in the world, owe love, appreciation, and 
respect for the ʿulamāʾ and rulers of the Kingdom.232 
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Expectedly, Surūr did not stay quiet in the face of these reprisals. In response to 
Jāmī criticism of young generation of Ṣaḥwī preachers, he defended the Salafī status of 
these upstart ʿulamāʾ, asserting that “they are Salafīs in fundamentals and branches and 
this is clear for everyone who reviews from their writings and explores their positions. 
They have had a significant role in the interpretation of the creed of Ahl al-Sunah wa al-
Jamaʿa, refuting the misconceptions of the enemies of Islam.”233 They also have 
contributed, according to Surūr, to the struggle against “the innovators,” “khawarj,” and 
“al-ghulāt.”234 Surūr defended the Ṣaḥwīs’ oppositional activities during the Gulf War by 
invoking a principle that he believed transcended loyalty to the ruler, specifically, the 
principle of “condemning the wrong.” He added that by writing and signing various 
petitions, which were also signed by a broad spectrum of other senior Muslim scholars, 
these young ʿulamāʾ did not infringe upon the approach of the pious ancestors in the past 
and present.235 
Surūr followed up on this idea of “condemning the wrong” by demonstrating his 
jurisprudential view on a host of issues concerning the legitimacy of the ruler, potential 
rebellions against him and the position of the scholars. Recognizing that it is mandatory 
to uphold the principle of “listening and obedience of the ruler in case the ruler imposes 
the sharīʿa on his subjects,”236 Surūr nevertheless believed that the obedience to the walī 
al-amr is still conditional on his maintenance of “al-amr bi-l-maʿrūf wa-nahy ʿan al-
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munkar” or commanding good and forbidding wrong. “Obedience,” according to Surūr, 
“does not mean acquiescence, tyranny, and oppression.”237 Surūr denied the principle of 
giving private, discreet advice behind the palace walls adopted by the Jāmīs and the 
traditional Wahhābī ʿulamāʾ. For Surūr, it is unacceptable for the advice to be secret; as 
long as the violation of the sharīʿa was in public, then the advice should be in public 
too.238  
Surūr elaborated upon his opinion of the ʿulamāʾ who support political rulers by 
distinguishing between two types. He argued that after the abolition of the Khalifate, the 
rulers of the Muslim countries replaced the provisions of Islamic law with ignorant 
European law. The rulers also practiced a “gagging policy against their people and 
distributed injustice, corruption and disintegration everywhere.” 239 He also lamented that 
in modern times, the ʿulamāʾ no longer possess the freedom to write, preach and give a 
religious verdict.240 Surūr distinguished between two types of ʿulamāʾ who provide 
support to the rulers. The first category of the ʿulamāʾ support the ṭāghūt (despotic ruler) 
and issue fatwas that contradict the sharīʿa, including rulings that effectively legalize 
“usurious banking” and justify “bloodshed of the (Ṣaḥwī)ʿulamāʾ.”241 The other group of 
ʿulamāʾ might be fooled by the ruler who seeks to take advantage of their knowledge, 
honesty, and popularity among the people for their purposes. The ruler insists on these 
ʿulamāʾ accepting high positions in the religious field, promising them the cooperation of 
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the state to execute reforms in the Kingdom. After the fall of these ʿulamāʾ into the trap 
of the ruler, they begin to change their attitudes and opinion regarding many issues, often 
remaining silent. These ʿulamāʾ justify their new discourse and silence in terms of the 
fear that the Kingdom might otherwise fall into fitna (internal strife); they also contend 
the situation in Saudi Arabia is better than in neighboring countries.242 
Surūr discussed the silence of some ʿulamāʾ and their refusal to clearly state any 
legal opinion on the violation of rulers against the sharīʿa for fear of abetting a descent 
into dangerous civil wars, or fitna. In particular, Surūr attributes the state of fitna not to 
ʿulamāʾ who voice some criticism of the regime, but instead, to those ʿulamāʾ who 
abandon correct legal jurisprudence and contradict past ruling in an effort to appease the 
rulers. For instance, some of those ʿulamāʾ issued fatwas or legal opinions that 
contradicted their previous opinions or the sharīʿa in fear of antagonizing the ruler. Surūr 
also believed that the true source of al-fitna is not the critical or autonomous ʿulamāʾ, but 
rather, those who shamefully issued fatwas legalizing repression against other ʿulamāʾ.243 
It is required from the ʿulamāʾ, according to Surūr, not to bear arms against the rulers or 
instigate the people against them, but to—at the bare minimum—issue clear legal 
opinions against those rulers who do not properly apply the sharīʿa.244 He also denied the 
claim of some ʿulamāʾ that the rulers in Saudi Arabia might deserve some special 
dispensation—despite some errors and deviations— for being comparatively upright in 
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comparison to the situation in neighboring countries. Such a relativist view, according to 
Surūr, does not exempt scholars and preachers from the duty of denying wrong.245 
Towards a New Reformism: Fiqh al-Waqiʿ and Ongoing Polemics 
Building on resources found in the Islamic legal literature, the Ṣaḥwīs revived the 
fiqh al-waqiʿ (jurisprudence /understanding of reality) and sought to use it as a tool to 
enhance their domination in the Islamic sphere. According to some, advocating the fiqh 
al-waqiʿ endowed the Ṣaḥwīs with superiority over the traditional Wahhābī ʿulamāʾ, who 
were seen as isolated from reality. On one hand, this expertise demonstrated that the 
Ṣaḥwīs could fuse an extensive religious background with good knowledge of modern 
sciences such as social sciences. However, the jurisprudence of reality also proved a 
controversial topic engendering heated debate between the Surūrīs and the Jāmīs at the 
beginning of the 1990s.  
The fiqh al-waqiʿ is one of the key concepts in Islamic jurisprudence. The concept 
was first coined by Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziyya, a famous Ḥanbalī scholar and a student 
of Ibn Taymiyya. In al-Jawziyya’s view, the mufti and the judge are required to 
understand two points in order to issue a correct fatwa and verdicts. He wrote: 
The first is having a grasp of reality. The faqīh should draw a conclusion of what 
is happening based on evidence, indications, and signs so that he comprehends it. 
The second is understanding of what is required with respect to reality, which 
means understanding the ruling (judgment) of God and his Prophet that it is 
established in His book or on the tongue of His Prophet in light of this reality. 
After that, he should apply the one (matter) to the other.246 
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Nāsịr al-ʿUmar, a key figure in the Ṣaḥwa movement who is often referred to as a leading 
Surūrī, earned a doctorate from the college of the fundamentals of religion at Imam 
Muhammad ibn Saud Islamic University in 1984, when he began teaching at the same 
university. In his 1980s-era lectures, he invoked the concept of fiqh al-waqiʿ first 
expounded by early Islamic scholars.247 Specifically, he talked about the importance of 
this “ʿilm” and argued that “of the reasons of backwardness of the umma is its ignorance 
of reality.”248 He defined the fiqh al-waqiʿ as “a science looking into understanding 
contemporary circumstances, such as factors influencing/acting on societies, 
forces/powers dominating states, ideas directed to undermine the faith, and the legitimate 
ways of protecting the umma and making it advance now and in the future.”249 This ʿilm 
requires that specialists learn not only the religious knowledge (ʿaqida and fiqh), but also 
social sciences (history) and modern knowledge (politics and media).  
Al-ʿUmar also emphasized that the practitioners of this type of fiqh should 
continuously engage in the pursuit of learning by following new developments in the 
sciences and news. 250 He clarified that those who analyze and evaluate contemporary 
events must avoid biased negativity, but instead try to understand the reality in an 
objective fashion.251 Furthermore, he encouraged those who want to specialize in fiqh al-
waqiʿ to read historical studies and other scholarly works on politics, international 
relations, and political economy, not to mention Muhammad Surūr’s Then Came the Turn 
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of Majūs and Muhammad Qutḅ’s Our Contemporary Reality.252 He also highlighted 
many of the positive outcomes of the fiqh al-waqiʿ, particularly as a tool to counteract the 
enemies who might plot against the umma and the ʿulamāʾ. He explained that “the 
secularists are plotting against the ʿulamāʾ of umma and seeking to distort their image 
before the public by raising controversies in religious and scientific issues which might 
seem a contradiction in the fatwa and weakness in ʿilm.” To avoid that, “the fatwa has to 
be based on a conception of reality... which gives the fatwa respect and strength.”253 
Unsurprisingly, the Jāmīs sought to belittle the importance of this notion of 
grasping reality in the fiqh al-waqiʿ and accused its advocates of deviation from the right 
Salafī path. Shaykh Rabīʿ b. Hādī al-Madkhalī claimed that the Ṣaḥwīs who advocated 
the fiqh al-waqiʿ diverged from the teachings of great scholars such as Ibn al-Qayyim al-
Jawziyya. He insisted that the Ṣaḥwīs revived the fiqh al-waqiʿ only for political purposes 
against the Wahhabi ʿulamāʾ. He also believed that the Ṣaḥwīs’ focus on this type of fiqh 
over other types of religious sciences is dangerous because it would distance the young 
generation from religious studies and preoccupy them with politics. Furthermore, al-
Madkhalī sought to further demean the importance of awareness of the fiqh al-waqiʿ by 
arguing that such knowledge it intended for a small group of people such as the rulers and 
the ʿulamāʾ; the laymen, by contrast, have no need to understand this field. Often, al-
Madkhalī referred to those who advocate the fiqh al-waqiʿ pejoratively with the epithet of 
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fuqahāʾ al-wāqiʿ (fuqahāʾ of reality) or al-mutaḥamisūn li fiqh al-waqiʿ (the enthusiasts 
for the jurisprudence of reality).254 
The core of the Jāmī argument against “the fiqh al-waqiʿ stemmed from the view 
that such an emphasis represented a malicious plot against the religious sciences in 
general, and the ʿulamāʾ of the umma in particular. The aim of the advocates of this fiqh 
is elimination of the sharīʿa and an unacceptable alteration of the words of the Qurʾān 
and Sunna.”255 Al-Madkhalī accused “the enthusiasts for the fiqh al-waqiʿ” of 
exaggerating the importance of the fiqh al-waqiʿ and elevating other sciences over 
sharīʿa. He proclaimed that in fact, fiqh al-waqiʿ should not be called either ʿilm or 
fiqh.256 Furthermore, al-Madkhalī alleged that the fuqahāʾ al-wāqiʿ dangerously accused 
the ʿulamāʾ of ignoring reality and not having enough knowledge of it.257 Finally, Al-
Madkhalī claimed that the fiqh al-waqiʿ exhibited dangerous political goals. This 
approach, according to al- Madkhalī aims to cast aside the Salafī methodology and divide 
the minds of youth from the Wahhabi ʿulamāʾ.258  
Surūr, unsurprisingly, responded harshly in what would become an extended 
cycle of polemics and bitter argumentation, seeking to maintain the Ṣaḥwīs’s gains by 
refuting the Jāmīs’ attacks and defending the young Ṣaḥwīs scholars who revived the fiqh 
al-waqiʿ and its stress on ʿilm. He also argued that the campaign of the loyalists against 
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this school of fiqh amounted to little more than a defense of the Saudi royal family and an 
attempt to justify its illegal activities and repression.  
Surūr considered the fiqh al-waqiʿ a condition that must be met in the fatwa and 
the mufti. He cited the saying of the Ahl al-Ḥadīth scholar Muḥammad Nāsịr al-Dīn al-
Albānī, who also commanded considerable respect among the Jāmīs,  
Understanding reality to reach the sharʿī ruling is an important duty that a 
specialized and smart group of seekers of knowledge have to do. This is just like 
any other branch of knowledge, whether it has to do with sharīʿa, social sciences, 
economics, military matters or any other branch of knowledge that is of benefit 
the Islamic umma and will bring it back to its position of glory and leadership, 
especially when these branches of knowledge are developing from one time and 
place to another.259  
Surūr asserted that all the ʿulamāʾ and seekers of religious knowledge, who are engaged 
in the fiqh al-waqiʿ, “are known with authenticity in belief, the abundance of ʿilm, and 
standing by the boundaries set by Allāh.” He denied al- Madkhalī’ accusation of 
exaggeration in the importance of this fiqh. He also contended that the young ʿulamāʾ did 
not exceed the lines drew by Ibn al-Qayyim and al-Albānī, adding that “these people (the 
loyalists) know that who aims at overthrowing the sharīʿa is an infidel, so how can those, 
who defend ʿulamāʾ, accuse other ʿulamāʾ of committing infidelity and apostasy, even 
though the methodology is the same and the belief is the same?!”260 Surūr rejected the 
claim of the loyalists that fiqh al- waqiʿ is a conspiracy against the sharīʿa.  
Finally, the arguments on behalf of fiqh al-waqiʿ culminated with his claim that 
this methodology represented not only the correct sharʿī, but that it amounts to a farḍ 
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kifāya (a communal obligation), rather than a farḍ ʿayn (an Individual obligation). In 
another words, if some of the scholars undertake it, the obligation is waived for the 
other.261 Surūr discussed al-Madkhalī’s castigation of the sources used in this type of fiqh 
as unreliable. Surūr argued that people who are specialized in ʿilm must acquire extensive 
religious knowledge, examine the news that they obtain, and explain and publish the 
sources upon which they rely.262 Surūr gave an example in which he intended not only to 
explain his idea and refute al-Madkhalī’s critique, but also to criticize the Saudi regime. 
He stated that “if the news recurs from the kuffār about an official visit of American 
officials to Riyāḍ, and then held a series of meetings with their Saudi counterparts that 
resulted in an agreement (that) what the media of walī al-amr has kept silent from 
publicity - as usual - and published in details by American media outlets and discussed 
and endorsed it by the Congress, would we deny this news because the infidels were only 
people circulated it.”263 Despite the effort of al-Madkhalī to undermine the bases of this 
knowledge, Surūr, with his example, wanted to refute al-Madkhalī’s claims and take the 
debate back to its core underlying issue: namely the Saudi Arabian relationship with the 
United States and the West in general. 
Debate about Tawḥīd al-Ḥākimiyya 
These debates over the proper place of loyalty to the Saudi state for Muslim 
scholars also spilled over into other arenas of intra-Salafi theological polemics, including 
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the concept of tawḥīd al-ḥākimiyya. In particular, the debates about the authenticity and 
legitimacy increased within Salafī circles at the start of the 1990s. Before we go further in 
examining this debate about the authenticity and legitimacy of the tawḥīd al-ḥākimiyya, it 
is essential to explain the meaning and connotations of this concept. Al-ḥākimiyya (the 
sovereignty of God) means that the sovereignty belongs only to God and He is the One in 
whom is vested the right of legislation, judging and executing the judgments. Abū l-Aʿlā 
Mawdūdī (1903–79), the Indo-Pakistani scholar, introduced the concept of al-ḥākimiyya 
in the twentieth century to modern Islamist discourse. Influenced by Mawdūdī’s works, 
Sayyid Qutḅ also picked up the term and popularized it across the Middle East as 
discussed in chapter 1.  
Joined to the concept of al-ḥākimiyya, in turn, was the idea of tawḥīd, the unitary 
oneness of God—a universally acknowledged—core component of Islam and the most 
critical aspect in Salafism and Wahhabism. In order to achieve an accurate understanding 
of the concept and to prevent their Muslim followers from stumbling into unsanctioned 
“innovation,” the Salafī Wahhābī ʿulamāʾ broke down the concept of tawḥīd into 
categories. Perhaps the earliest figure associated with Wahhabism, the Saudi Shaykh, 
Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb (l. 1703-1792), divided it into three constituent 
components: tawḥīd al-rubūbiyya (Oneness of Lordship), tawḥīd al-ulūhiyya (Oneness of 
divinity), and tawḥīd al-asmāʾ wa al-ṣifāt (Oneness of names, qualities, and attributes). 
These classifications are for the most part accepted among Wahhābīs. However, it is 
important to note that these categories are not present in the Quran and Sunnah but were 
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developed by Wahhābī scholars to facilitate the understanding of texts and rulings of 
sharīʿa.264 
Meanwhile, political events and other perceived social changes encouraged 
Ṣaḥwīs to combine the concept of al-ḥākimiyya with concept of ṭawḥīd. The much-
discussed intervention of American troop in the Arabian Peninsula increased the fears of 
the Ṣaḥwīs about being dominated by the encroaching colonial powers. The Ṣaḥwīs also 
began to combat the secular influence that appeared at that time in the Kingdom and 
called for separation between religion and state.265 As a reaction to these calls, the Ṣaḥwīs 
pioneered the fusion of the concept of al-ḥākimiyya with the concept of ṭawḥīd, forming a 
new category of ṭawḥīd, known as ṭawḥīd al-ḥākimiyya to educate Muslims about the 
importance of the oneness of God’s rule.  
However, linking the idea of God’s sovereignty with ṭawḥīd elicited the 
opposition of Jāmīs who believed that creating a new category of ṭawḥīd constituted an 
act of bidʿa and an unnecessary addition. The main concerns of the Jāmīs were that the 
Ṣaḥwīs did not show full commitment to practicing ṭawḥīd, and their emphasis on al-
ḥākimiyya and ṭawḥīd al-ḥākimiyya simply emanated from malign political purposes. In 
his writing, Al-Madkhalī referred to the Ṣaḥwīs who call and promote ṭawḥīd al-
ḥākimiyya as “people of politicians” who have political agendas.  
Al-Madkhalī criticized Islamist groups who preoccupied themselves with politics, 
the call for al-ḥākimiyya and the establishment of the Islamic state. Al-Madkhalī did not 
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neglect al-ḥākimiyya and argued that “the call for al-ḥākimiyya and its implementation 
are the important thing… in case its conditions were observed.”266 However, as for the 
ṭawḥīd al-ḥākimiyya, al-Madkhalī rejected making a fourth category of ṭawḥīd. For him, 
it represented yet another act of unlawful innovation and a political plot by politically 
oriented Islamist rivals to achieve al-ḥākimiyya and establish their vision of an Islamic 
state. He also believed that the division of ḥākimiyya into a separate classification of 
ṭawḥīd represents a distortion of the true meaning of ṭawḥīd.267 
Surūr vociferously responded to these Jāmīs’ arguments yet again by invoking a 
common refrain: the idea that loyalists “entered the battle in response to the order of walī 
ul-amr.”268 Surūr argued that the Jāmīs “appointed themselves as attorneys on behalf of 
their wūlāt omūrihm (rulers)” to justify their failures in full implementation of sharīʿa.269 
The exiled religious scholar specifically argued that “the talk about the ṭawḥīd al-
ḥākimiyya for the loyalists has become like a political act, can do nothing but harm, 
because it leads inevitably to clash with the regimes.”270 In his view, it is a religious duty 
upon Muslims to propagate the call for the ṭawḥīd al-ḥākimiyya and seek to achieve full 
implementation of Allah’s laws.  
Surūr also defended ṭawḥīd al-ḥākimiyya as a valid classification of ṭawḥīd and 
opposed the accusation that it constituted an innovation. He stressed its importance by 
citing the works of a range of classical and contemporary Wahhābī ʿulamāʾ including 
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Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb himself. Surūr noted that Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb 
considered “those who believe that the Prophet (peace and blessings of Allāh be upon 
him) did not complete his guidance or that the rule (judgment) of the others is better than 
his rule (judgment), as those who prefer the ruling of ṭāghūt (tyrant) on his rule are kafirs 
(infidels).”271 He also asked whether the loyalists have read the work of Shaykh 
Muḥammad Amīn al-Shanqīṭī, who saw “the one who follows an order other than God’s 
law and legislation is like worshiping an idol and worshiping idolatry, and there is no 
difference between them in any way, they are one, both are idolaters.”272 For Surūr, the 
Jāmī position on ṭawḥīd al-ḥākimiyya just represented one more example of their total 
subordination to the Saudi rulers despite their violation of Islamic decrees. 
Surūr continued his refutation of the Jāmīs and accused them of espionage, not to 
mention writing false reports to slander the Ṣaḥwa and the Ṣaḥwīs. According to Surūr, 
al-Madkhalī erroneously linked fiqh al-waqiʿ (jurisprudence of reality) and ḥākimiyya 
with rebellion against the rulers in his writings. In order to prove his claim, al-Madkhalī 
mentioned the names of the Ṣaḥwa preachers and misquoted their sayings. Then, he 
analyzed these quotations and heavily imputed meanings that distorted the actual words. 
Al-Madkhalī also called these chosen examples from sayings and writings of the Ṣaḥwīs 
“foretastes of rebellion.” Finally, he warned the ruler “to be aware of those Khawārij 
(Kharijites) and strike them with an iron fist.”273  
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Surūr concluded that the dispute between the Jāmīs or “the ḥizb -wūlat” (party of 
loyalists) and what he called the centrist preachers of the Free Salafīs, otherwise known 
as the Ṣaḥwīs, did not fundamentally hinge on religious matters such as the position 
regarding the innovators or the way of commanding good and forbidding wrong. Instead, 
he observed that the loyalists “entered this battle in response to the orders issued by the 
rulers, who handed over the reins of affairs in the Arabian Peninsula to American 
polytheistic and their allies.” He added that the loyalists “will not be pleased unless the 
rulers are pleased, and the rulers will not be pleased unless the Americans are pleased.”274 
For Surūr, the Jāmīs amounted to little more than a tool in the service of political rulers. 
By 1994, the Jāmīs appeared victorious after jailing the key figures of the Ṣaḥwa 
such as Safar al-Ḥawālī and Salmān al-ʿAwda. With the backing of the Saudi government 
and adoption of the popular Ahl al-Ḥadīth trend, the Jāmīs became an essential player in 
the Islamic circle in Saudi Arabia and contributed to weakening the authority of the 
Ṣaḥwa by drawing some followers. The conflict impacted the Jāmīs themselves by 
changing the very nature of the group. A group that first appeared as a daʿwa group 
calling for refraining from politics transformed into an organization dedicated to 
criticizing other Islamist movements. In the highly polarized moment of the Gulf War, 
the group began to take more a ḥarakī character by embracing the tools of a political 
party, like attracting followers and having leadership and goals. In general, it is noted that 
this conflict resulted in the weakening of the Ṣaḥwa phenomenon, at the expense of the 
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growth of other trends. The liberal orientation and other religious trends, like the people 
of jurisprudence, made their way to the scene again.275 
Examining the debates among non-violent Salafīs reveals the dynamics of the 
Salafi scene in Saudi Arabia in the late twentieth century. The Ṣaḥwīs invoked and 
reformulated concepts in their pursuit to find tools to help them in their religious 
reformist project, which emphasized maintaining the importance of sharīʿa and 
incorporating modern sciences with religious knowledge. However, the Jāmīs, who 
adopted a purist Salafī approach, sought to demean this discourse by linking it with the 
revolutionary discourse of the Muslim Brotherhood, highlighting the limits of these 
concepts, and questioning their consistency with Salafī methodology.  
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Chapter 5 
Surūr’s Rejection of Violence and Extremism 
Activist (ḥarakī) Salafīs from different schools belong to the same overarching 
ideological and creedal Islamic school of thought and pursue overlapping goals. Despite 
such broad similarities, these activists engaged in vigorous debates and intellectual 
conflicts over the emergence of elements that we might call “extremist,” who embraced 
divergent methods and tactics in their pursuit of broadly shared goals against the larger 
backdrop of turbulent politics in the Islamic world of the late twentieth century. Two 
prominent examples of such extremist discourses that proved especially divisive within 
the Salafī movement include the idea of “takfir,” or declaring a Muslim to be a kāfir [an 
unbeliever] because of an aspect of their belief or actions, and the embrace of violence as 
a tactic. In this chapter, I will examine how such beliefs polarized Salafīs into non-violent 
and violent political factions, this time pitting the “centrist” Surūrīs not against the Saudi 
state or “Jamī Salafī loyalists,” but against more radical forces within Salafism. 
From the outset of his career, Surūr adopted a non-violent approach to Islamist 
politics that would soon inform his denunciation of the wholesale declarations of takfīr 
employed by certain Salafi Muslims against co-religionists who do not share their 
doctrines or interpretation of the sources of Islam. Surūr expressed particularly harsh 
criticism of those Muslims who deployed violence as a tool for implementing sharīʿa, 
denouncing in no uncertain terms any indiscriminate attacks made by Muslims against 
fellow Muslims. He described the extremists as ignorant of Islamic precepts and 
specifically condemned their advocacy of takfīr and violence as a form of unacceptable 
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bidʿ (innovations.) Surūr argued that their lack of religious knowledge impaired their 
ability and eligibility for giving legal rulings or opinion. Although they draw from the 
Qurʾān and other foundational sources of Islam, Surūr contended, they selectively choose 
verses and evidence in a way that agree with their bidʿ (innovations) of takfīr and spilling 
Muslim blood. Diving into history, Surūr blamed the phenomenon of takfīr that emerged 
in the late of the 1960s and the early 1970s on the repression of the Muslim Brotherhood 
by various Arab regimes and the mistreatment of members of other Islamist groups in 
Arab prisons.276 Thus, repressive regimes bore a large measure of the blame for providing 
fertile ground for the emergence of radicalism, according to Surūr. However, while this 
scholar mostly blamed unjust regimes, he also took to task the practitioners of such 
wayward takfīrī doctrines, attributing their errors to the lack of religious knowledge 
among their leaders and adaptation of extreme ideas in their religious interpretations of 
takfīr from Khawārij (Kharijites). This chapter sheds light on Surūr’s position toward 
extremist groups and their ideology and demonstrates the main differences between non-
violent and violent political Salafīs. 
Surūr embraced a decisive position against what he called “al-Ghulāt” (the 
exaggerators/ extremists/ radicals), and he specifically provided a detailed refutation of 
the ideology of two such organizations, al-Takfīr wa al-Hijra (Excommunication and 
Exodus/Emigration) led by Shukri Muṣṭafā in Egypt and the Armed Islamic Group 
(GIA), an Islamist group which gained notoriety for using mass violence during the 
Algerian Civil War. He argued in his writings about the incompatibility of such extremist 
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ideologies with the creed of the ahl al-sunna wa al-jamāʻa (the Sunnis; lit. people of the 
tradition of the Prophet and community). Given Surūr’s reputation as a leading exponent 
of Salafism, his condemnation and refutation of the doctrines of al-Ghulāt posed a 
profound threat to these groups, who also claimed to adhere to the same Salafī creedal 
school. Indeed, Surūr was one of the first political Islamists who warned of the 
phenomena of extremism and takfīr among the Muslim groups in Egypt and Algeria in 
several books and articles, perhaps prefiguring criticism of groups like ISIL in the 21st 
century. In 1986, even before the emergence of Al-Qaʻida or the War on Terror, Surūr 
penned the book al-Ḥukum Bighīr Ma Anzal Allāh wa ahl al-Ghulw (Ruling by what God 
has not revealed and the People of Extremism), in which he examined the origins of the 
Shukri Muṣṭafā group’s extremist ideology and demonstrated its deviations from the 
manhaj of ahl al-sunna wa al-jamāʻa. Surūr also argued that in modern times, takfīr 
doctrine and extremism did not exist before this group.277 
In his 1986 book, Surūr noted that the doctrine of takfīr first appeared in the 
second half of the twentieth century inside the infamous Egyptian prisons when 
thousands Muslim Brotherhood member confronted ruthless repression by the Egyptian 
government. He demonstrated that a small group of the imprisoned activists led by the 
Azahri shaykh, Ali Abdo Ismail, who formulated its religious foundations, began to adopt 
extremist ideas such as takfīr in the 1960s.278 The most prominent manifestations of these 
ideas are declaring takfīr on the Egyptian regime under the leadership of Gamal Abdel 
Nasser. Then, they extended such charges of apostasy to Egyptian society writ large, 
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noting that ordinary people supported the ruler and did not rebel against the regime.279 
These radicalized prisoners, in turn, developed the belief that a person cannot be a 
genuine Muslim unless he joined their group “Jamāʿa al-Muslimīn” (the Society of 
Muslims); all outsiders, by contrast, were infidels.280  
Surūr explained that these prisoners derived aspects of their new ideology from 
the texts and conceptions of the Khawārij (Kharijites).281 Eventually, Shaykh Ali Abdo 
Ismail later renounced this idea of takfīr entirely, but his erstwhile followers reorganized 
around a young, charismatic agricultural engineer student, Shukri Muṣṭafā, who was 
imprisoned from 1965 to 1971 because of his activism in the Muslim Brotherhood. After 
his release from prison in the beginning of the 1970s, he found Jamāʿa al-Muslimīn.282 
The group was crushed by Egyptian security forces and Mustafa was executed in 1977 
after the group assassinated Muhammad Hussein al-Dhahbi, an Islamic scholar who was 
the former Minister of Islamic Endowments and a vocal critic of the Jamāʿa al-Muslimīn 
group.  
The group is often popularly referred to as al-Takfīr wa al-Hijra, or 
“Excommunication and Exodus/Emigration,” a derogatory term used by the Egyptian 
media after its confrontation with the government.283 In the 1970s, leaders of the group 
believed that jihād was not possible at that time. Thus, they urged their followers and true 
Muslims to denounce the kāfir (non-Muslim infidel) nature of Egyptian society, to isolate 
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themselves from it and to perform hijra (emigration) to establish an authentic society 
through education (tarbiyya). Then, once they built their strength, they could come back 
to conquer and re-Islamize the Egyptian nation.284  
It is notable that Surūr, himself an active promoter of the teachings and writings 
of Sayyid Qutḅ, would deny that Qutḅ’s ideas were compatible with the takfīr doctrinal 
ideology of this group and its leaders.285 Yet, despite such denials, Shukri Muṣṭafā was 
influenced by Qutḅ’s doctrines of Hijra, al-Jāhiliyya and al-ḥākkimyya, but embraced the 
most extreme interpretation possible by declaring all of society takfīr.286 Surūr also 
observed that the extremist ideology of the Shukri group derived much of its content from 
the ideology of the Khawārij, especially the issue of takfīr. For Surūr, the propagation of 
a doctrine of takfīr constituted the key source of bid’a and deviation, particularly in the 
way it justified bloodshed against other Muslims and the usurpation of their wealth.287 
In his writings, Surūr reviewed doctrines of the group and discussed the religious 
errors of its theological structure. Surūr pointed out that Shukri Muṣṭafā’s conceptions, 
forged within prison, violated the principles of Islam and the methodology of Ahl al-
Sunna wa al-Jamaa in several specific ways. First, he criticized the group’s rejection of 
taqlīd (imitation of four Sunni canonical legal schools (madhahib). As we mentioned 
before that most of the Salafis promote ijtihad and reject taqlīd. However, they are 
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different on the degree of following or rejection of existing jurisprudence. For followers 
of Shukri Muṣṭafā, taqlīd functioned as the source of polytheism because it promotes 
blind subservience to Islamic scholars. According to Mustafa, the source of this error 
derived from the fact that the masses accepted the judgments of the muqallid (who 
performs taqlīd) without asking about the dalīl (proof). Instead, Shukri Muṣṭafā argued, it 
is obligatory for each Muslim to perform individual ijtihād. Consequently, his followers 
believed that each Muslim should be a mujtahid, and the one who performs taqlīd is 
kafir.288  
The competing interpretations regarding taqlīd among different schools of 
Muslims are extensive and cut in many different political directions. In the 19th and 20th 
centuries, Muslim reformists such as Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī, Muḥammad ʿAbduh, and 
Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍā, who sought to respond to the Western cultural and political 
threat but at the same use the West as a model for imitation, opposed the principle of 
taqlīd. These reformers regarded taqlīd as a source of cultural and intellectual stagnation 
for Muslims. Instead, they encouraged ijtihād that gives more room for independent 
reasoning and depends less on the traditional schools of law and the mystical orders.289 
Most modern Salafīs are agreed, in broad principle, on the importance of ijtihād 
reasoning and the rejection of the taqlīd of the four Sunni schools. However, they 
diverged on the full extent to which they should reject or follow the opinions of these 
schools. Muḥammad Nāsịr al-Dīn al-Albānī, a major influencer on the modern Salafī 
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movement, rejected taqlīd, condemned it as a reprehensible innovation, and insisted that 
the Muslim can acquire the religious knowledge easily.290 
In accordance with his radical Salafi centrism, Surūr admitted the reprehensible 
nature of taqlīd as practiced by the bāṭinīs, or those who focus on an inner, esoteric 
(bāṭin) meaning in the interpretation of religious texts, as well as other ṣūfī exaggerators 
and the Khawārij. In Surūr’s estimation, throughout the history of Muslim community, 
these groups had all left a lasting legacy of terrible consequences. Surūr blamed the 
“deviated groups” for improper use of taqlīd, which led Muslims to the unthinking 
acceptance of the views of the leaders of their school of thought, who were in turn treated 
with great veneration by their followers. He also noted that Muslims had turned away 
from the Qurʾān and Sunnah to dedicate themselves to the study of the books and letters 
of their shaykhs; ultimately, Surūr believed these books functioned as barriers between 
Muslim believers and the key scriptural texts that constituted the only true way to learn 
the Islamic sciences.  
While Surūr stressed the importance of Muslims seeking religious knowledge, 
however, he also asserted the permissibility of taqlīd for ordinary people who had not 
immersed themselves in a life of religious scholarship. He believed that if ordinary 
people attempted to perform ijtihād, they would not have time to do anything other than 
acquiring religious knowledge, thereby hobbling trade, crafts, and agriculture in the 
Islamic community.291 Surūr added that even some of Ṣaḥāba (companions) did not reach 
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the degree of ijtihād required to practice taqlīd.292 At the same time, he stressed that 
permissibility of taqlīd should not be equated with the end of Muslims seeking their own 
path to religious knowledge or expressing blind loyalty to the opinions and fatwas of a 
scholar.293 In sum, he took a middle path that preserved taqlīd while conferring more 
responsibility to the individual believer—consistent with his radical Salafi centrism. 
Furthermore, Surūr argued that followers of Shukri Muṣṭafā discarded ijmāʿ, or 
the concept of consensus of Islamic scholars, a practice regarded by Sunni Muslims to be 
the primary principle of Islamic law (sharīʿa). Surūr particularly lamented that such 
radicals did not stop at condemning those who see the ijmāʿ as a legitimate proof, but 
went so far as to declare takfīr (excommunication) against them.294 Surūr defined ijmāʿ as 
a consensus of the mujtahidūn (pl. mujtahid, the learned scholar) on a particular legal 
ruling and affirmed it is impossible for the mujtahidūn of the people of the Sunna to reach 
total agreement on an issue that does not have proof from the Sunna of the Prophet.295 
Yet, Surūr argued that ijmāʿ does not comprise the abstract words or opinions of men, as 
Shukri claimed, but rather, the considered judgment of scholars based on legitimate 
evidentiary text.296 He listed a series of verses from the Qurʾān and Ḥadīth as a basis of 
this principle’s legitimacy.297 Surūr added “all that the Shukri’s group wrote in criticizing 
the ijmāʿ is not at all new.” They derived their thoughts from the people of rāfiḍa (the 
rejectionists) and al-muʿtazilah without citing the sources they used.298 
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The quickness of Shukri and his group to declare takfīr on fellow Muslims who 
commit major sins is one of the main criticisms of Surūr against the ideology of Shukri’s 
group. For instance, according to Surūr, Shukri and his followers pronounced various 
Muslims who commit major sins, such as shirk (associating partners with Allāh) or 
committing murder and adultery even if they pray and fast on Ramadan, as kufār.299 From 
this point of view, they excommunicated some of the prophets and messengers such as 
Adam and Ibrahim, because they committed sins.300 Shukri’s group, according to Surūr, 
relied on generalities, logical fallacies, inaccuracies and distortion of the word to justify 
their positions.301 Surūr argued that declaring takfīr against the sinners is a bid’a 
(innovation) and that the Sunni position does not consider Muslims disbelievers because 
of their sins.  
Surūr also criticized Shukri and his followers for their claims that they alone 
represent true Islam and that their leader (Shukri) is the al-mahdī (messiah); indeed, 
members of this group went so far as to believe that the Egyptian authorities could not 
kill Shukri, and that he would never die.302 He condemned the group’s “call for illiteracy” 
and their misinterpretation of the texts. Surūr accused Shukri’s followers of believing that 
learning writing, and reading are forbidden, thereby condemning the Islamic umma to 
illiteracy, and they believe that the Muslims should instead direct their effort and time to 
learn only religious sciences. For example, since Shukri invoked the Ḥadīth which says, 
“we are an illiterate nation; we neither write, nor know accounts,” his followers 
 
299 Ibid., 211. 
300 Ibid., 407. 
301 Ibid., 212. 
302 Ibid., 289-291. 
107 
 
concluded that the Muslims should be Ummiyūm (illiterates).303 Surūr discussed this 
point, citing the interpretation that says the word Ummiyūm in this Ḥadīth refers to the 
Arabs before Islam who were generally illiterate by comparison to later “people of the 
books.”304 
With the eruption of the Algerian Civil War and the rise of radical groups that 
fought jihād against the Algerian government in the 1990s, Surūr published in his al-
Sunnah magazine a series of articles criticizing the extremists, particularly their 
methodology, violent approach, and lack of religious knowledge. It is important here to 
note that Surūr did not, therefore, offer a more “moderate” approach, at least in a political 
sense, simply because of his rejection of takfīr and violence—rather, his stance 
comprised something more akin to what I describe here as “radical Salafi centrism.” He 
still rejected electoral processes as a legitimate means to establish the Islamic state. He 
believed that the parliamentary elections were not only a waste of time, but because they 
originated from secular societies, stood in conflict with Islamic principles; he also 
believed that Islamists who participated in the elections did not achieve the electoral 
promises they made despite their many concessions. Instead, like other Salafīs, Surūr 
stressed the importance of military jihād in a general sense and saw its great virtue. 
At the same time, Surūr rejected the violence that was used by some of the 
Algerian Islamists such as the Armed Islamic group (GIA) to achieve their goal in 
establishing an Islamic state.305 In addition to his polemics against Shukri’s group, Surūr 
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provided refutations of a number of issues raised by the Armed Islamic Group (GIA). 
The GIA was one of the insurgent groups that fought the Algerian regime between 1992 -
2002. It emerged when Algeria’s military government decided to annul the 1992 election 
in which the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), the moderate Islamic political party, appeared 
to be winning the elections democratically. In its pursuit of establishing an explicitly 
Islamic state, the GIA waged a total war against the military government in Algeria. The 
group launched a campaign of violence, targeting not only the government and the 
military but also civilians, journalists, and foreign subjects. It also conducted a campaign 
against other Islamists who left the group or did not agree with the GIA.306 
Surūr began by criticizing the group for practicing killing and other brutal actions 
under the guise of jihād. In particular, he stated that the Ḥizb al-Ghūlāt raises the banner 
of jihād, but the content is different from the slogan.307 He added that they commit the 
most heinous crimes and the ugliest acts in the name of jihād and abuse this duty, giving 
people a distorted image of it.308 Surūr pointed out that the main characteristic of GIA is 
the legalization of the bloodshed of dissenters. He recognized the acceleration of the 
incidences of violence committed by that group, which increasingly assumed a 
destructive and indiscriminate character. Such incidences did not leave any segment of 
Algerian society unaffected. For instance, Surūr reported directly on conditions in 
Algeria, noting that “public roads have become unsafe because of shifting checkpoints 
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where they check passengers’ IDs. At which point they kill those they identified as 
members of military and those who did not comply with orders issued by the leadership 
of this party.”309 They blow up markets, under the pretext of killing a patrol of security 
men and they do not care if they victimize women, children, and the elderly.310 He added 
that the extremists in Algeria did not only justify killing members of the military and 
innocent civilians, but also issued a statement legalizing bloodshed of preachers and other 
Islamist groups leaders.311 In the end, he wondered what al-Ghūlāt would do to their 
fellow Muslims if they actually imposed their rule over Algeria and how many giant 
factories they were going to open for the manufacture of knives, daggers, and swords.312 
Ultimately, Surūr continued, as a scholar, refuting and addressing mistakes of 
extremists, specifically rejecting their religious rulings and opinions that justify the 
spilling of Muslim blood. Surūr argued that they are not qualified to issue fatwas because 
they lack ʿilm and the necessary learning requirements to issue fatwas. They selectively 
choose from religious sources to meet their desire without looking at the entirety of the 
Qurʾānic text and Ḥadīths that related to such matters. Such deviators from correct 
practice, according to Surūr, often involved the citation of a Qurʾānic verse or a Ḥadīth or 
sayings from the Salaf to derive a legal opinion or a ruling without any understanding of 
their true meaning and full context. 
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To buttress his contention that members of the GIA did not comprise legitimate 
religious scholars, Surūr mentioned five qualifications for a muftī and applied them to the 
extremists who issued fatwa in the most serious and legal (sharʿī) issues. Surūr argued 
that the extremists are ineligible to practice fatwa for many reasons. First, they “have 
busied themselves with the issues of apostasy and Khurūj (rebellion) and they do not 
have time for the study of the sciences of the Qurʾān and delving deeper into the sciences 
of Ḥadīth and fiqh.” They refuse to study at the hands of the distinguished ʿulamāʾ 
because, according to the extremists, they are hypocrites and scholars of authority.313 
Surūr suggested some characteristics that should be present in the muftī, which are 
“patience, serenity and reverence.” However, he described the extremists as “careless, 
hastiness, fury, and irascibility and their positions are volatile.” They will not be able to 
achieve neutrality and impartiality in their judgment.314 One of the most important 
conditions for a person who practices the fatwa is to have ʿilm (knowledge). This 
attribute is not present for anyone of the extremists, and none of them deserves to be 
called anʿālim (scholar). On the contrary, Surūr called them ignorant.315   
Another reason for the extremists in Algeria being disqualified from giving 
religious rulings is that they are people of innovation and desire. Rebellion (Khurūj) 
against the rulers is the main focus of the Ḥizb al-Ghūlāt’s activism and the basis upon 
which they determined their attitude towards others.316 Thus, the fatwa of advocates of 
this bidʿa is not acceptable because they are going to give a religious verdict in 
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accordance with their purpose and desire. They are going to choose the evidence with 
which they agree.317 
One contradiction that they fall in is that they speak in the name of the Salaf and 
believe that they are the only ones who understand and quote their sayings. Surūr 
admitted that all their fatwas include evidence from the Qur'an, Sunnah and the sayings 
of the Salaf. However, the problem, according to Surūr, is that they incorrectly 
characterize this evidence to support conclusions that amount to bidʿa directly 
contradicting what the evidence actually means.318 Surūr argued that it is not enough to 
gather relevant scriptural passages and insert them in a fatwa or a legal opinion. The muftī 
should comprehend and consider everything about the evidence before the quotation, 
such as their contexts and meanings. 
Surūr also noted that the issue of jihād al-ṭawāghīt (unjust tyrants) is the most 
important element in the methodology of these extremists. It is this concept, according to 
Surūr, that provided extremists with criteria to judge others and whoever disagrees with 
them as a misguided innovator.319 The al-Ghūlāt do not believe in seeking knowledge 
and education as a way to reform and establish the desired Islamic state. On the contrary, 
they think that all regimes in the Islamic world are infidel and apostate and that the best 
way to achieve these goals is to declare jihād and fight these governments. They believe 
that the fight against these regimes is an individual duty on every Muslim. The Armed 
Islamic Group (GIA) began killing ʿulamāʾ and preachers who do not support their 
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opinion of fighting the regime and then issued a statement that declared that it is not 
permissible to have more than one group to fight jihād against the Algerian government. 
It also declared that the GIA is the only legitimate jihādī group in Algeria. After this 
statement, the GIA added new targets to its list and conducted a violent campaign against 
other Islamists, such as the Islamic Salvation Army (AIS), who fought to reestablish an 
electoral process that had been annulled by a military coup in 1992.320 In the end, Surūr 
wondered if the extremists are aiming to establish an Islamic state with the strategy of 
gaining the enmity of the people. He stated that they declared wars on everyone at the 
same time and failed to distinguish between friend and foe.321 
Rebellion and fighting against the apostate regimes of the Muslim world are the 
core of the extremist ideology and the breakpoints between them and other groups. Any 
group that does not agree with these two principles automatically becomes an enemy for 
these extremists.322 Surūr gave his opinion regarding the rebellion against the “sinful 
unjust rulers.” He tended to the traditional view that says that it is not permissible to rebel 
and remove the “unjust ruler” if rebellion would result in greater disorder and leads to 
corruption, oppression, and bloodshed.323 It is important to remember that Surūr’s 
position about Saudi rulers did not exceed these lines. On one hand, he did not call for 
violent rebellion against the Saudi rulers. On the other, he believed that it is an obligation 
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to denounce the Saudi rulers in public when they contradict the sharīʿa. Surūr believed 
that rebellion against the “apostate ruler” who he ordered something contrary to the 
sharīʿa may be permissible under certain conditions. First, Muslims should provide 
advice to the ruler to curb his orders. Then, they should have “the capability” to remove 
the ruler without causing harm that is worse than that caused by the ruler in the first 
place.324 Additionally, the insurgent group must have a form of leadership with the 
qualifications of the ahl al-ḥall wa al-‘aqd (the people of loosening and binding) to 
reduce any possibility of lawlessness.325  
In conclusion, with the rise of the extremist tendencies, that promoted violence 
and adopted radical positions toward other Muslims, in the second half of the twentieth 
century, it was imperative for Surūr to present his views about these groups and refute 
their ideology. He rejected the campaign of violence and declared that because extremists 
do not have religious knowledge and their understanding for the Islamic sources is 
shallow, their fatwas do not have value. He accused them of bidʿ and following their 
desires, addressing the mistakes and warning them that what they are doing is clearly 
wrong. Surūr sought to refute their theology of justifying violence against those guilty of 
deviations and mistakes or religious error. He also criticized their perception of jihād 
asserting that it is not jihād at all, but it is bloodshed and criminality. 
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Despite the substantial differences between Surūr’s ideology and the extremists’ 
ideology, a few articles that appeared after his death argued that Surūr was responsible in 
one way or another for the rise in extremist movements, such as al-Qaeda and the Islamic 
State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in the contemporary Middle East. These articles argue 
that Surūr was the key figure who played the main role of transform of the traditional 
quietist Salafism to Salafi jihadism by introducing the revolutionary ideas of political 
Islam to it. These articles claim that Western and Arab scholars misconceived Surūr’s 
legacy; instead, they argue that he was a man who shares blame for the normalization and 
the prevalence of religious extremism and even set the intellectual foundations for the 
current trend of the Salafist-jihadist violence in the Middle East.326 Hussein Ibish, a 
senior resident scholar at the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, argues that Abu 
Muḥammad Al-Maqdisī, a Jordanian-Palestinian leading Salafī jihadī ideologue, was 
influenced in his teenage years in Kuwait by Surūr. He adds that although al-Maqdisi 
criticized Surūr for his lenient position toward the Arab regimes, he still provides a good 
example of this point of view.327 
In his remarkable book A Quietist Jihadi: The Ideology and Influence of Abu 
Muhammad Al-Maqdisi, Joas Wagemakers admits Surūr’s influence on al-Maqdisī, who 
later rejected his teachings.328 He argues that al-Maqdisī in his journey found that the 
purist Wahhābī religious tradition is the only one conferred the most authentic Salafi 
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nature and the tools by which he can excommunicate the political rulers. Wagemakers 
adds that Al-Maqdisī was strongly influenced by Juhayman’s supporters and their 
practice of radical concept al-walaʾ waʾ l-baraʾ (loyalty and disavowal). Al-Maqdisī 
developed the concept and took to its extreme political end by declaring takfīr against the 
regimes in the Muslim world for adopting to non-Islamic laws and the Saudi state 
because of its relations with the United States and the West. Hence, jihād would be an 
adequate form of disavowal and wholly based on Wahhābī reasoning.329 
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Chapter 6 
Conclusion 
After the death of the two most prestigious official Wahhabi scholars, Muftī Bin 
Bāz and Muḥammad Ibn ʿUthaymīn, the Sahwī ʿulamāʾ who were released from prison 
in 1999 became major religious actors in the Kingdom. According to Saʿd al-Faqīh, after 
their release, they decided to continue their daʿwa activism and refrain from political 
activities. They even played a role in countering the ideology of extremist groups, such as 
al-Qaʿida. After the reconciliation between the Surūrīs and regime, Surūr decided to tone 
down his criticism against the Saudi regime. According to Saʿd al-Faqīh, Surūr believed 
that the priority is to face the threats of Iran and the extremist groups. He visited the 
Kingdom many times to perform ʿUmra (visiting the holy sites in Mecca and Medina 
beyond the obligation of Hajj).330 
With the eruption of the Syrian uprising in 2011, Surūr declared his support for 
the revolution against the Baath regime from his last station in Qatar. He contributed to 
the establishment of many organizations such as the Syrian Islamic Council. 331 Surūr’s 
primary effort was his role in unifying different non-jihadist Islamist rebel brigades in the 
Syrian Islamic Liberation Front, one of the strongest armed coalitions in Syria at that 
time opposing Assad regime.332 The Syrian National Council, the most prominent 
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opposition’s political body, gave condolences upon Surūr’s death in 2016, memorializing 
as “a great symbol of moderation.”333 
Before he died, Surūr, in a video statement, also declared his support to Operation 
Decisive Storm, a military intervention launched by Saudi Arabia in 2015 that attacked 
the Houthi militia, an Iranian proxy in Yemen. In the broadcasted video on Al Jazeera 
Mubasher, Surūr stated that the long-waited operation would curb Iran’s covetousness in 
the region. He also praised the rulers of Saudi Arabia and described them as heroes.334 
Surūr’s burial in November 2016 was attended by thousands of people both 
within and outside of Qatar. The previous Amir of Qatar, Shaykh Hamad b. Thani and the 
political leader of Hamas, Khālid Mashʿal, along with many scholars and Islamic 
preachers, were among the senior figures to attend his funeral. The current Amir of Qatar, 
Shaykh Tamim b. Hamad and even Saudi Arabia’s Ambassador to Qatar visited the 
house of the Sheikh in Qatar to offer their condolences to his family and children.335 The 
key figures in the Sahwa posted their obituaries on social media, memorializing his good 
deeds.336 
This thesis sheds light on the thought of Shaykh Muḥammad Surūr, one of the 
early influencers of the Ṣaḥwa movement, and offers a close view of his synthesis, which 
is an amalgam of the political thought of the Muslim Brotherhood and religious ideas of 
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Wahhābīs. Furthermore, it shows the diversity of the Salafiyya movement by analyzing 
the relationship of the Salafī groups toward politics and violence. Through analyzing the 
intra-Salafī debates, the study contributes to the discussion on Salafism by examining the 
doctrinal differences between various groups.  
As we have seen, the influx of members of the Muslim Brotherhood from various 
Arab countries to Saudi Arabia between the 1950s and 1970s played an essential role in 
the emergence of the Ṣaḥwa movement. One member of the Muslim Brotherhood, the 
Syrian ideologue Shaykh Muḥammad Surūr, influenced the Ṣaḥwa and infused a ḥarakī 
orientation into purist and non-political Wahhābī circles. The political awareness of 
Muḥammad Surūr was shaped early in the ranks of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, 
where he learned the significance of organization and planning. Fleeing from the 
repression of the Baʿth regime, Surūr moved to Saudi Arabia in 1965 to work as a teacher 
in Scientific Institutes in the Kingdom. In Saudi Arabia, he began to be influenced by the 
doctrinal thought of the Salafī Wahhābī school.  
Surūr’s adoption of Salafiyya had a profound impact on the rest of his life. On the 
one hand, it facilitated his entry to the Saudi religious circles and introduced his ideas that 
played a significant role in formulating the Ṣaḥwa movement. On the other hand, his new 
convictions caused tensions with his previous Muslim Brotherhood compatriots. 
Although he decided to turn away from the Muslim Brotherhood and criticize it, he still 
bore the traces of Muslim Brotherhood influence to a significant extent. By the late 
1960s, he created a new formula which combined aspects of the Muslim Brotherhood 
with the Salafī teachings. Under the influence of Surūr’s ideas, a new group known as the 
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al-Surūriyya the main group known as the within the Ṣaḥwa movement, appeared which 
had a significant impact on Saudi Islamic activism. 
Surūr is also known for his anti-Shīʿa views that were very influential in the 
1980s and the 1990s, continuing to the 2000s. He was one of the early polemicists who 
criticized the Iranian Revolution and warned against the threat of Shīʿite domination of 
the Middle East. He developed a set of anti-Shīʿa ideas that were ethnic, doctrinal, and 
political. On the doctrinal level, he was influenced heavily by the Salafī Wahhābī anti-
Shīʿa thoughts, which see Shīʿism as a deviant sect. Interestingly, Surūr contributed to 
anti-Shīʿa thoughts by adding ethnic and political aspects to his polemics. He warned 
from “Persian Majūsī rāfiḍī” enlargement into the Gulf, Iraq, and the Levant. The Syrian 
Shaykh was particularly skeptical about the alliance between the Iran revolutionaries and 
“ʿAlawī Syrian regime,” thereby articulating a political version of anti-Shīʿism. 
Surūr positioned himself and his followers as free centrist Salafis and 
distinguished himself from two types of Salafis who he called the “ḥizb al-Ghulāt” 
(radicals) and the “ḥizb al-Wulāt” (loyalists). On one hand, Surūr rejected the violent 
approach of the radicals in pursuing their goals, but he also condemned the loyalists who 
called for total obedience for the rulers. The Gulf crisis and the first protests against the 
Saudi government in the 1990s reignited the old discussion about the validity of Salafi 
participation in politics. The debates between Surūr and what he called “ḥizb al-Wulāt,” 
who adopted a quietist posture, sheds light on the ongoing discussion about the question 
of political engagement among Salafis. 
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Consistent with the traditional Sunni view that emphasizes stability and warns 
from rebellion and internal strife, Surūr rejected khurūg (rebellion) against the oppressive 
or unjust rulers to maintain unity and social order. At the same time, he believed it is 
permissible to call publicly on the government to pursue reform and challenge the 
political authority for not fulfilling the implementation or violation of the sharīʿa.  
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al-Madkhalī, Zayd b. Muḥammad b. Hādī. Al-irhāb wa-athāruhu ʿalā l-afrād wa-l-umam 
(Terrorism and its Effects on Individual and Nations) (United Arab Emirates, 1418 
(1997). 
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------. “Naḥwa Kiyān Jadīd (33) Al-Ḥiwār Bayna Ahl al-Sunah: Al-Salafiyyia bayna al-
Wulāt wa al-Ghulāt” [Toward new Entity (33) Dialogue between the People of 
Sunnah: The Salafism between the Loyalist and the Extremists, Al-Sunnah 72, 
(1997): 111-130. 
Surūr’s bio under the title “Al-Shaykh Muḥammad Surūr Zayn al-ʿĀbidīn … Sīrah wa 
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Appendix A 
I followed the transliteration system used in Journal of Islamic Studies issued by 
the Oxford Center of Islamic Studies to spell the Arabic words. 
